Matching, Learning and Social Network in CEO and Director Labor Market

The labor market of top managers and directors is not a market in the ordinary sense. Instead of a perfect market with a large numbers of buyers and sellers engaged in relatively anonymous exchange, there is a small market in which buyers and sellers are few and socially connected. Instead of principals directly transacting with agents, there is a disconnect between the interest of principals (shareholders) and their agents (directors). Instead of a low-risk transaction in which all the necessary information is freely available and widely circulated, there is a significant lack of information about potential candidates and about the position itself. The purpose of this dissertation is to provide a comprehensive study, both theoretically and empirically, to identify the impact of board learning, CEO-firm matching, and director’s social networks on this labor market. Specifically, I explore the following questions: How do firms identify their new CEOs? What is the role of board of directors in selecting new CEOs? How do firms identify potential directors? What is the role of social networks in this process? How do director and managers’ social networks affect firm value?

Qianru(Cheryl) Qi, PhD: is an Assistant Professor in Financial Economics at the School of Economics, Fudan University, China. Her research focuses on Corporate Governance and has got grants from the Ministry of Education of China, Shanghai Government and Purdue Research Funds. She holds a Ph.D. in Economics from Purdue University.