Mechanism design, Mathematical Economics and Statistics | Prospect theory, First Price auctions, Myerson-Satterthwaite theorem

Dushko Josheski (u. a.)

ISBN 10: 6202552816 / ISBN 13: 9786202552813

Published by LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing, 2020

About this Item

Mechanism design, Mathematical Economics and Statistics | Prospect theory, First Price auctions, Myerson-Satterthwaite theorem | Dushko Josheski (u. a.) | Taschenbuch | 100 S. | Englisch | 2020 | LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing | EAN 9786202552813 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: preigu GmbH & Co. KG, Lengericher Landstr. 19, 49078 Osnabrück, mail[at]preigu[dot]de | Anbieter: preigu.

Seller Inventory # 118496500

Bibliographic Details

• Title: Mechanism design, Mathematical Economics and Statistics | Prospect theory, First Price auctions, Myerson-Satterthwaite theorem
• Publisher: LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing
• Publication Date: 2020
• Language: English
• ISBN 10: 6202552816
• ISBN 13: 9786202552813
• Binding: Taschenbuch
• Condition: Neu
• Dimensions: 220W x 150H x 7D millimeters 220 millimeters width by 150 millimeters height by 7 millimeters depth
• Weight: 167 grams
• Seller catalogs:
  • Bücher

About this title

Synopsis

This books covers three topics in mathematical economics and economics theory which are solved by the use of methods from mathematical statistics. It starts with a mechanism design that covers themes such as: Vickrey–Clarke–Groves Mechanism, Vickrey auction, Mechanism Design Illustrated in a Walrasian Example,Constructing Decentralized Mechanisms, from Parameter Indexed Product Structures: Transition to Message-Indexed Product Structures. Than it continues with Prospect theory that covers themes such as: Prospect theory and Cumulative prospect theory, and their use in explanation of overbidding. And the final essay is: Myerson-Satterthwaite theorem and asymmetric FPA auctions, that includes numerical solution of the asymmetric auctions.