Mind, Language, And Society: Philosophy In The Real World

For years, Searle (Intentionality; The Mystery of Consciousness; Minds, Brains, and Science), a professor of philosophy at UC-Berkeley, has battled against philosophical fashion to insist that the world is, in fact, intelligible to the human mind. This may sound unremarkable to laypeople. But, as Searle remarks, at a time when postmodernism and deconstruction are in vogue, intellectuals, to be taken seriously, often must believe that different cultures have different rationalities and that the world as a whole is unintelligible. Searle, however, defends the naturalistic belief that there does exist a real world, which is perceivable and comprehensible and is not changed by the angle of our observation. Among his most forceful arguments are that consciousness is a genuine phenomenon caused by knowable physical processes; that intention is real, produced by causal mechanisms in the brain; and that language expands the possibilities of intentionality. In an interesting aside, Searle speculates that contemporary thinkers reject an objectivist theory because of "an urge to power." They don't want to be answerable to the world but for the world to be answerable to them. To Searle, however, realism "is not a theory at all but the framework within which it is possible to have theories."
Copyright 1998 Reed Business Information, Inc.

Why would any intelligent person want to read about philosophy? Searle (Philosophy/Univ. of Calif., Berkeley) presents a far too circuitous guide for those brave souls prepared to enter the philosophical labyrinth. Searle attempts a down-to-earth synthesis of his views ``on mind, language, and society, . . . how they relate to each other, and how they fit into our overall conception of the universe.'' In the tradition of what is nowadays quite unpopularly referred to as the ``logical positivists,'' Searle goes a step further: after analyzing reality into its parts, he wants to put it all back tgogether in a constructive mode. The main thesis, however, which is never fully articulated, involves thes rejection of Nietzsches belief that reality is constructed through our interpretation of it while affirming his notions of the will to power. The nonspecialist will surely miss the import of this complex argument with Continental philosophy and postmodern thought. Theory and system take precedence over clear and precise explanation. So, for example, one essential technical term, ``Cartesian dualism'' is found in the introduction but the reader must wade through 44 pages before finding out that dualism is a notion ``of radically different kinds of entities in the universe, material objects and minds'' and that this particular form of duailsm is named after Ren Descartes. Searle never really bothers to unpack the nature of logical arguments or show us how to ask the right philosophical questions. Bertrand Russell, in his The Problems of Philosophy, points out that ``philosophy is to be studied not for the sake of any definite answers to its questions, since no definite answers can, as a rule, be known to be true, but rather for the sake of the questions themselves.'' Searle spends too much time making claims ``to have knowledge of the real world'' and too little time on the rest of us who are still trying to find some meaning in the often confusing, painful reality of our world. -- Copyright ©1998, Kirkus Associates, LP. All rights reserved.

Searle's purpose in this book is to present his views "on mind, language and society, and to explain how they relate to each other, and how they fit into our overall contemporary conception of the universe." He starts by considering the metaphysical concepts of reality and truth, then uses them as a basis for an explanation of the origin and nature of mind, language, and consciousness. Such an ambitious project requires in-depth inquiry, and Searle's attempt to write "in summary form" is indicative of what is wrong with this short work: it contains far too little detailed, rigorous argument to be of use to philosophers, yet not enough elucidation of the philosophical concepts to really be comprehensible to the general reader. This is unfortunate and disappointing, since Searle (philosophy, Univ. of California, Berkeley) has done substantial work in the past. Readers will have to consult his earlier books to understand the positions he deals with so summarily here. Only comprehensive philosophy collections will want to acquire this.ALeon H. Brody, U.S. Office of Personnel Mgt. Lib., Washington, DC
Copyright 1999 Reed Business Information, Inc.