Minimum Deterrence and India?s Nuclear Security

Rajesh M. Basrur

ISBN 10: 0804752567 / ISBN 13: 9780804752565

Published by Stanford University Press, 2005

About this Item

Offering an assessment of India's nuclear strategy, this book shows that the country's nuclear-strategic culture is generally in accord with the principle of minimum deterrence, but is sometimes inconsistent and has a tendency to drift into a more open-ended process. Series: Studies in Asian Security. Num Pages: 264 pages, 1 table. BIC Classification: 1FKA; JPS; JWMN. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational; (UP) Postgraduate, Research & Scholarly; (UU) Undergraduate. Dimension: 5817 x 3887 x 15. Weight in Grams: 354. . 2005. Paperback. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.

Seller Inventory # V9780804752565

Bibliographic Details

• Title: Minimum Deterrence and India?s Nuclear Security
• Publisher: Stanford University Press
• Publication Date: 2005
• Language: English
• ISBN 10: 0804752567
• ISBN 13: 9780804752565
• Binding: Soft cover
• Condition: New

About this title

Synopsis

In this book, a leading authority on India’s nuclear program offers an informed and thoughtful assessment of India’s nuclear strategy. He shows that the country’s nuclear-strategic culture is generally in accord with the principle of minimum deterrence, but is sometimes inconsistent and has a tendency to drift into a more open-ended process. He addresses areas of concern, notably the relationship between minimum deterrence and subnuclear conflict, the threat from nuclear terrorism, and the special challenges nuclear weapons pose for a democratic society.

About the Author

Rajesh M. Basrur is Director of the Centre for Global Studies in Mumbai, India. He has been a visiting fellow at Sandia National Laboratories, the Brookings Institution, and the Henry L. Stimson Center.