New Issues in Epistemological Disjunctivism (Routledge Studies in Epistemology)

ISBN 10: 103209284X / ISBN 13: 9781032092843

Published by Routledge, 2021

About this Item

Seller Inventory # V9781032092843

Bibliographic Details

• Title: New Issues in Epistemological Disjunctivism (Routledge Studies in Epistemology)
• Publisher: Routledge
• Publication Date: 2021
• Language: English
• ISBN 10: 103209284X
• ISBN 13: 9781032092843
• Binding: Soft cover
• Condition: New

About this title

Synopsis

This is the first volume dedicated solely to the topic of epistemological disjunctivism. The original essays in this volume, written by leading and up-and-coming scholars on the topic, are divided into three thematic sections. The first set of chapters addresses the historical background of epistemological disjunctivism. It features essays on ancient epistemology, Immanuel Kant, J.L. Austin, Edmund Husserl, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. The second section tackles a number contemporary issues related to epistemological disjunctivism, including its relationship with perceptual disjunctivism, radical skepticism, and reasons for belief. Finally, the third group of essays extends the framework of epistemological disjunctivism to other forms of knowledge, such as testimonial knowledge, knowledge of other minds, and self-knowledge. Epistemological Disjunctivism is a timely collection that engages with an increasingly important topic in philosophy. It will appeal to researches and graduate students working in epistemology, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of perception.

About the Author

Casey Doyle is Junior Research Fellow in Philosophy at St. Hilda’s College, University of Oxford, UK.

Joseph Milburn is a research fellow at the Center for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Notre Dame, USA.

Duncan Pritchard is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh, and Director of the Eidyn research centre. His monographs include Epistemic Luck (2005), The Nature and Value of Knowledge (co-authored, 2010), Epistemological Disjunctivism (2012), and Epistemic Angst (2015).