This is an excellent advanced study in strategy in the nuclear age. Cimbala covers the field thoroughly. He challenges much of the conventional and established approaches to deterrence and crisis management. . . . Cimbala's work is a valuable and refreshing addition to the literature. Scholars will find it enriching and challenging. . . . This is a must acquisition for university and professional libraries. Choice
Cimbala critically examines the rational behind Western defense policies based on deterrence. According to the author, nuclear strategizing--or coping with outside threats--is shortsighted--dependent as it is on economic analogies and technical fixation. It leaves unanswered important questions about the relationships between strategy, politics, and long-term defense goals. Cimbala examines a number of issues from this point of departure, including: arms control, de-escalation and escalation, control of nuclear forecast, and the future of conventional forces.
STEPHEN J. CIMBALA is Professor of Political Science at Penn State University, Delaware County. He has contributed to the literature of international relations and U.S. security and defense policy for more than 20 years, and he has written or edited more than 30 books. Among his latest publications are Collective Insecurity (Greenwood, 1995) and Clinton and Post-Cold War Defense (Praeger, 1996). In addition, Cimbala serves on the editorial review boards of several journals, including Armed Forces and Society.