Optimal Regulation : The Economic Theory of Natural Monopoly

Train, Kenneth E.

ISBN 10: 0262200848 / ISBN 13: 9780262200844

Published by MIT Press, 1991

About this Item

Pages intact with minimal writing/highlighting. The binding may be loose and creased. Dust jackets/supplements are not included. Stock photo provided. Product includes identifying sticker. Better World Books: Buy Books. Do Good.

Seller Inventory # 9376194-6

Bibliographic Details

• Title: Optimal Regulation : The Economic Theory of Natural Monopoly
• Publisher: MIT Press
• Publication Date: 1991
• Language: English
• ISBN 10: 0262200848
• ISBN 13: 9780262200844
• Binding: Hardcover
• Condition: Good
• Weight: 1.649 pounds

About this title

Synopsis

Optimal Regulation addresses the central issue of regulatory economics - how to regulate firms in a way that induces them to produce and price "optimally." It synthesizes the major findings of an extensive theoretical literature on what constitutes optimality in various situations and which regulatory mechanisms can be used to achieve it. It is the first text to provide a unified, modern, and nontechnical treatment of the field. The book includes models for regulating optimal output, tariffs, and surplus subsidy schemes, and presents all of the material graphically, with clear explanations of often highly technical topics.

Topics include
The cost structure of natural monopoly (economies of scale and scope) • Characterization of firstand second-best optimality • Surplus subsidy schemes for attaining first-best optimality • Ramsey prices and the Vogelsang-Finsinger mechanism for attaining them • Time-ofuse (TOU) prices and Riordan's mechanisms for attaining the optimal TOU prices' Multipart and self-selecting tariffs, and Sibley's method for using self-selecting tariffs to achieve optimality • The Averch-Johnson model of how rate-of-return regulation induces inefficiencies • Analysis of regulation based on the firm's return on Output, costs, or sales • Price-cap regulation • Regulatory treatment of uncertainty and its impact on the firm's behavior • Methods of attaining optimality without direct regulation (contestability, auctioning the monopoly franchise.)

About the Author

Kenneth E. Train is Associate Adjunct Professor in the Department of Economics and Graduate School of Public Policy at the University of California, Berkeley. He is also Principal of the firm Cambridge Systematics.