Synopsis
Aruges the Gorbachev's new initiatives present a genuine opportunity for change, and looks at the future
Reviews
McNamara maintains that Washington's reaction to Mikhail Gorbachev's "new thinking" has been unduly skeptical, cautious and unimaginative. The former U.S. defense secretary under presidents Kennedy and Johnson argues that Gorbachev's reassessment of national-security and geopolitical objectives represents a profound break with the Soviet past; that his bold proposals have been accompanied by a remarkable flexibility at the negotiating table; and that the West must take advantage of "the greatest opportunity since the end of World War II" to end the Cold War. In this brief, trenchant essay, McNamara offers suggestions for a system of collective security based on a "code of conduct" which, if adhered to by the superpowers, would serve such areas of potential conflict as Arab-Israeli relations, the Persian Gulf, Latin America, and the sale of arms to Third World nations. The book offers a useful review of the origins and evolution of the Cold War, the practical results of Gorbachev's foreign and defense policy initiatives, as well as Western reaction to the dramatic shift in the Soviet position.
Copyright 1989 Reed Business Information, Inc.
The author's Blundering into Disaster ( LJ 11/1/86) and this make a nicely matched set. In the previous book, McNamara, Secretary of Defense under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson and former President of the World Bank, warned the Reagan adminstration to change its strategic thinking to avoid nuclear disaster; here he's concerned with leading the Bush administration out of the Cold War. After briefly reviewing the origins of the Cold War, McNamara moves to his central theme, which is twofold: to delineate Gorbachev's "new thinking" in Soviet domestic and foreign policy; and to craft a response to the sharp changes in East-West relations based upon a vision of what the new international arrangements will be. McNamara, like others, is concerned that the United States can flexibly move to new initiatives after 40 years of Cold War thinking and only 40 months of Gorbachev. His book will help as it is a clear, nontechnical exposition of the need for "new thinking" in U.S. policy. Recommended for all readers, not just specialists in foreign policy.
- Richard B. Finnegan, Stonehill Coll., North Easton, Mass.
Copyright 1989 Reed Business Information, Inc.
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