Kvasz’s book is a contribution to the history and philosophy of mat- matics, or, as one might say, the historical approach to the philosophy of mathematics. This approach is for mathematics what the history and philosophy of science is for science. Yet the historical approach to the philosophy of science appeared much earlier than the historical approach to the philosophy of mathematics. The ?rst signi?cant work in the history and philosophy of science is perhaps William Whewell’s Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, founded upon their History. This was originally published in 1840, a second, enlarged edition appeared in 1847, and the third edition appeared as three separate works p- lished between 1858 and 1860. Ernst Mach’s The Science of Mech- ics: A Critical and Historical Account of Its Development is certainly a work of history and philosophy of science. It ?rst appeared in 1883, and had six further editions in Mach’s lifetime (1888, 1897, 1901, 1904, 1908, and 1912). Duhem’s Aim and Structure of Physical Theory appeared in 1906 and had a second enlarged edition in 1914. So we can say that history and philosophy of science was a well-established ?eld th th by the end of the 19 and the beginning of the 20 century. By contrast the ?rst signi?cant work in the history and philosophy of mathematics is Lakatos’s Proofs and Refutations, which was p- lished as a series of papers in the years 1963 and 1964.
This book offers a reconstruction of linguistic innovations in the history of mathematics; innovations which changed the ways in which mathematics was done, understood and philosophically interpreted. It argues that there are at least three ways in which the language of mathematics has been changed throughout its history, thus determining the lines of development that mathematics has followed.
One of these patterns of change, called a re-coding, generates two developmental lines. The first of them connecting arithmetic, algebra, differential and integral calculus and predicate calculus led to a gradual increase of the power of our calculating tools, turning difficult problems of the past into easy exercises. The second developmental line connecting synthetic geometry, analytic geometry, fractal geometry, and set theory led to a sophistication of the ways we construct geometrical objects, altering our perception of form and increasing our sensitivity to complex visual patterns.
Another important pattern of change, called relativization, is illustrated by the development of synthetic geometry, connecting Euclid’s geometry, projective geometry, non-Euclidean geometry, and Klein’s Erlanger Programm up to Hilbert’s Grundlagen der Geometrie. In this development the notions of space and geometric object underwent deep and radical changes culminating in the liberation of objects from the supremacy of space and so bringing to existence geometric objects which space would never tolerate.
The book offers tools of analysis by means of which scholars and students of the history and philosophy of mathematics can attain better understanding of the various changes, which the subject of their study underwent in the course of history. The book brings also important insights for mathematics education connecting growth of language with the development of mathematical thought.
