Synopsis
This book provides a complete and convincing account of what rights we do and do not have, who has them, and why. Presenting the foundations of a liberal, individualistic theory of rights, Lomasky explains the place of rights within the overall structure of morality, arguing for the moral importance of individual commitments to and pursuit of "projects." After developing his theory of basic rights, Lomasky demonstrates its implications for a variety of problems and issues, including property rights, the rights of children, and the status of the unborn, defective persons, animals, and even the dead. Arguing for a fundamental reshaping of philosophical ethics, Lomasky develops a credible alternative to currently fashionable views.
Reviews
This account of basic moral rights concerns whether they are necessary, to what kind of being they can be ascribed, their nature, and to whom they extend. Lomansky contends that rights are a kind of shorthand category for well-entrenched moral intuitions, principles, and standards whose aim is to support individualism as of paramount moral significance. The category is useful, he thinks, even though we lack a fully adequate theory generating these rights. They derive from a person's identity as a purposive agent, but must be sensitive also to ends that are not his exclusively. Intended primarily for professional philosophers, the book includes interesting discussions of welfare liberalism and of the (alleged) rights of children, fetuses, animals, etc. Robert Hoffman, Philosophy Department, York College, CUNY
Copyright 1987 Reed Business Information, Inc.
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