Philosophical Analysis : A Defense by Example

Austin, D.S.

ISBN 10: 1402031505 / ISBN 13: 9781402031502

Published by Springer 2004-10, 2004

About this Item

Seller Inventory # 6666-IUK-9781402031502

Bibliographic Details

• Title: Philosophical Analysis : A Defense by Example
• Publisher: Springer 2004-10
• Publication Date: 2004
• Language: English
• ISBN 10: 1402031505
• ISBN 13: 9781402031502
• Binding: PF
• Condition: New

About this title

Synopsis

Analytic philosophy is alive and in good health, as this collection of twenty, previously unpublished essays most ably demonstrates. The reader will find here assembled some of the finest writings of modern analytic philosophers at the top of their form. Matthews discusses Plato's attempt to deal with the problem of false belief about identities. Parson evaluates Russell's early theory of denoting phrases. Chisholm exhibits the utility of thirteen epistemic categories. Plantinga criticizes Chisholm's account of justification. Conee argues that solving the Gettier Problem is important, and Ginet proposes a solution to it. Lehrer criticizes an argument based on the simplicity of our belief in material objects and other minds. R. Feldman defends an account of having evidence. F. Feldman defends a propositional account of pleasure. Van Fraassen criticizes Garber's solution to the problem of old evidence. Castaņeda investigates the nature of negation. McKay argues that de se analyses of belief do not account for belief de re. Richard argues that no Fregean semantics for belief attribution will succeed. Ryckman suggests that the Millian theory of names has little to do with the theory of belief is no threat to God's omniscience. Dunn investigates constraints imposed on non-classical modal logics by extensionality. Fitch argues that singular propositions perform important functions in modal logic. Jubien evaluates arguments for and against possible worlds. Ratzsch argues that there must be a deeper source of nomicality than ordinary subjunctives, and Stalnaker argues that there is room for determinancy of identity and indeterminacy in reference.