CHAPTER 1
THE POLITICS OF Southeast Asia
LUCIAN W. PYE
I. BACKGROUND
There is a quality of newness about Southeast Asia. The very term "Southeast Asia" came into common usage only with World War II and the creation of the South-East Asia Command. The end of colonialism and the rise of Communist China has caused the world to take a new interest in tropical Asia. The sense of the new and the contemporary stems also from the region being composed of newly emergent countries with youthful leaders who are striving to bring their peoples out of the old world of traditionalism and colonialism and into the modern world. The quality of newness in Southeast Asia comes also from a generation of peoples seeking to live without a history and with only hopes. Lacking a common store of memories, the people cannot look to the past for strength and guidance. They must look the other way, and in doing so they can see only a tentative present and an unsure future. The region is in such a state of flux that both outsiders and Southeast Asians find it difficult to gain perspective and hence the temptation to seek reality in immediate problems.
This emphasis upon the new and the contemporary is not entirely misplaced, for a fundamental characteristic of Southeast Asian societies is their involvement in a process of social change as a result of their exposure to the West. For all of the countries in the region, except Thailand, the Western impact included a period of colonial rule. Indeed, the modern history of Southeast Asia is largely a matter of various forms of colonial practices stimulating changes in all aspects of traditional societies which in time led to the development of nationalistic movements. With the emergence of seven new states in the postwar period, the dominant theme of Southeast Asia is the effort of the leaders of these new countries to create modern nation-states out of their transitional societies. These leaders have committed their peoples to the task of establishing representative institutions of government and developing more productive modes of economic life. Although enthusiasm for these goals has not been lacking, it is difficult to estimate their chances of being realized, for it is still hard to discern even the outlines of the political and social systems that are evolving in Southeast Asia. The possibility of failure is great, and leaders and citizens can be troubled with self-doubts. Already the tendency toward more authoritarian practices is widespread: for example, armies are coming to play roles that were originally reserved for democratic politicians.
The challenging task for the student of Southeast Asia is that of trying to determine the forces which will shape the future of the region.
The Physical and Human Setting
Southeast Asia consists, first, of a band of loosely organized and relatively underpopulated societies along the southern fringe of the massive and overpopulated East Asian continent, and, second, of the two island countries of Indonesia and the Philippines. The region is about as large as all of Europe and its adjacent seas. There are few regions as large as this with so uniform a climate, not only over the entire area but throughout the year. Except for parts of upper Burma and northern Thailand, and a few variations due to altitude, the average monthly temperatures for the entire region are within ten degrees of 80° at all seasons. In over ninety years Java has never had a temperature recorded above 96° or below 66°.
The population of Southeast Asia is rapidly approaching 180,000,000 (see Table I). Only a century and a half ago there were barely 10 million people in the region, and since the First World War the population has grown by nearly 100 million. The population of the region is distributed extremely unevenly, so that congestion and empty spaces are found side by side. Java, one of the most densely populated areas of the world, has a total of over 800 people to the square mile and in some areas there are over 3,000 people living on each square mile. The other crowded areas are Lower Thailand and the Red River Delta with densities of over 1,500 people per square mile, and Lower Burma, Central Luzon, and the Lower Mekong with over 750 persons to the square mile. The rest of Southeast Asia is relatively underpopulated: only 8 per cent of Vietnam and Cambodia is cultivated and settled; Sumatra has less than 50 people to the square mile; and the general average of Burma, Malaya, and Thailand is less than 100 persons per square mile.
Indonesia, with over 82 million people, is the largest country of Southeast Asia, and its 3,000 islands stretching for over 3,000 miles along the Equator cover a territory somewhat larger than that of the United States, while the total land area of the islands is equal to about one-fourth the area of the United States. The Philippines consist of over 7,000 islands, of which eleven make up over 95 per cent of the total land area. The Philippines, Burma and Thailand each have populations approaching 20 millions; Vietnam has about 28 millions, Cambodia 4.3 millions, and Laos has anywhere from 1 to 2½ millions.
Southeast Asia is relatively rich in natural resources. Europeans were first attracted to the region by the spice trade, and later the West introduced such commercial crops as rubber, copra, sugar, and coffee. Now the region produces nearly 90 per cent of the world's rubber, 53 per cent of its tin, 75 per cent of its copra, 55 per cent of its palm oil, and 20 per cent of its tungsten. However, agriculture is the dominant way of life in Southeast Asia, and the region is the only major food-exporting area of Asia. The vast majority of Southeast Asians are peasants who are relatively self-sufficient.
The division between the production of raw materials for world trade and the peasant agriculture has created what is generally referred to as dual economies in Southeast Asia. One sphere of the economic life of these countries is closely tied in with world trade, while the other is still largely based on agricultural self-sufficiency. The development of exports was largely the work of Europeans during the colonial period, and since independence most of the countries have indicated a desire to diversify their economies and initiate more industrial activities. However, the pressing problem in much of Southeast Asia is still that of raising production to prewar levels. In spite of the setbacks that came with the war and the breakdown of law and order in some countries after independence, Southeast Asians generally have a higher standard of living than is common to the rest of Asia. For example, in comparison with the per capita income of India, the Malayans are nearly five times as well off and the Thais and Filipinos are about three times as well off.
From this brief introduction to the Southeast Asian scene, it will be apparent that almost every phase of life in the region has been strongly influenced by the Western impact. However, in order to appreciate the full significance of the interaction between the traditional aspects of Southeast Asian societies and the Westernization process, it is first necessary to outline the character of Southeast Asia before the arrival of the West.
Traditional Culture
It is peculiarly difficult to settle on what should be taken as the "traditional" indigenous cultures of Southeast Asia, for historically one of the most distinctive characteristics of the region is the extent to which it has been subjected to external influences. From the beginning of recorded history the area has received waves of migration bringing new religions and new cultures. The Portuguese and the Spanish, the English and the Dutch, the French and the Americans have been only the latest to leave their stamp on different parts of the region. Before the West arrived, Southeast Asia was already a melting-pot of diverse cultures. Indeed, as Cora Du Bois has suggested, "There is probably no other area of the world so richly endowed with diverse cultural strains." And certainly there are few areas that provide a better opportunity for studying the process of cultural diffusion.
The spread of these various earlier cultures did not always occur in clearly separated stages so that one impact could be fully absorbed before the arrival of the next. Rather, in many cases it was only with the appearance of a new cultural impact that the immediately preceding one became deeply ingrained and thus appeared to be a part of the "traditional" culture. For example, we know that as early as 1292, when Marco Polo visited Sumatra as the ambassador of the Emperor of China, a small town at the northern tip of the island had been converted to Islam. However, the final stages of the spread of Islam through Malaya, Indonesia, and on to Mindanao in the Philippines were not completed until the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when the West was just beginning to appear in the region. As Western power expanded in the area, the hold of Islam was strengthened rather than weakened. This was particularly the case in the Indies, where the position of Islam was largely consolidated only after the introduction of Dutch rule. And, although the Muslim religion in Indonesia never completely replaced the earlier religions and cultural attitudes, it is significant that the roots of Indonesian nationalism are to be found first culturally in the Modern Islamic movement and then politically in Sarekat Islam, a nationalist organization founded in 1912.
Even before the advent of Islam and the West, the history of Southeast Asia centered on the movement of peoples and cultures into the region. The extent to which there was movement outward from Southeast Asia is far from clear. There is the possibility that Pithecanthropus, or "Java Man," may have moved northward into continental Asia while evolving into Sinanthropus. Also, it has been hypothesized that the pre-Aryan cultures of India may have originated within Southeast Asia. The dominant theme, however, has always been movement inward, and it is generally accepted that the waves of migration of different human types — the Australoid, Negrito, Melanesoid, and finally the Indonesian or Austronesian — all came into the area from continental Asia. This last physical type, which is divided between the Deutero-Malay, the general Malay type common to present Southeast Asia, and the Proto-Malay, now represented by most of the Dayaks of Borneo, the Jakun of Malaya, and a few other small groups, probably moved into the region between 2500 and 1500 B.C.
The beginning of recorded history finds Indian and Chinese influences already a major factor in the religious and political development of the region. It has been customary to divide Southeast Asia into two principal cultural areas: one consisting of Tonking, Annam, and Cochin-China, where Chinese influences have dominated since the fall of the Indianized kingdom of Champa in the fifteenth century; and the other consisting of the rest of the region, where Indian influences had mastery. It has also been customary to say that Indian influences were more cultural than political, while Chinese influences were predominantly political.
This generalization, however, requires a great deal of qualifying. It is true that the Chinese explicitly saw in Indo-China, and to a lesser extent in Java, Sumatra, and parts of Burma, areas of possible political domination toward which they applied their principles of suzerainty. These principles rested, however, upon assumptions about the superiority of Chinese culture and its relations to less civilized peoples. Thus, wherever Chinese political influences dominated, Chinese culture also made inroads, and in Annam Confucianism became the state ideology and the traditions of a Mandarinate were well established. On the other hand, the Indian states did not see in Southeast Asia an area for imperial expansion and direct political control. However, Hindu and Buddhistic influences did have a profound political effect on the development of the early Southeast Asian state. Indeed, it was these influences which produced the Indianized states that were the important empires of early Southeast Asia, and in some cases the states were actually established by Indians. In contrast, the Chinese, in spite of the numbers who ventured into the region and their advantages as representatives of a superior culture, did not attempt to create independent governments, except for a few abortive efforts by Chinese freebooters in Borneo.
The nature of Chinese culture probably acounts for its failure to influence deeply the peoples of Southeast Asia. Chinese culture was an integrated whole in which the Confucian code of ethics and social behavior, and a basic philosophy of life, were all inextricably interwoven with the fabric of the Confucian state. In Southeast Asia, except where the Chinese directly imposed their own form of government, the necessary framework for an acceptance of Chinese culture was lacking. In contrast, Indian culture was based on religion and thus it could spread among peoples regardless of the political structure and in time provide the bases for the subsequent creation of Indianized states.
It would be difficult to exaggerate the importance of Hindu and Buddhistic influences on the political and court life of the early states of Funan, Khmer, and Angkor in present-day Cambodia; Srivijaya on Sumatra; Sailendras, Singhasan, and Majapahit on Java; and the Pagan and Pegu states of Burma. However, the peoples of Southeast Asia had their own civilizations, which were only slightly modified by Indian influences, and except for some questions of religion, and the need of providing manpower for warfare and wealth for the court, the lives of the common people were little affected by the development of the Indianized states.
For our purposes it is not necesary to become involved with the histories of these early Southeast Asian states and empires. Our concern is with the general characteristics of their societies, and in particular we are interested in those features of their social structures and patterns of political control which are relevant for understanding the current scene. It should be noted that a conscious awareness of the early historical period has played little part in shaping contemporary developments. Indeed, it is possible that much of the early history of Southeast Asia would have been forgotten had it not been for the work of a small group of European historians and archaeologists. In spite of the remarkable achievements of these scholars, it must be said that most of the historical research on Southeast Asia is still at the stage of focusing on dynastic and chronological questions with a secondary emphasis upon religions and the development of those art forms which have survived to this day. Work on broader social, economic, and political problems has hardly begun and progress is likely to be exceedingly slow, not only because of the inherent difficulties but because contemporary studies attract more attention. This means that there are many gaps in our knowledge and that in seeking to depict the general features of Southeast Asian cultures it is necessary on many points to advance only tentative generalizations. Although this cannot be emphasized too strongly, it would be tedious to repeat the qualification at every turn.
