Politics and Property Rights (Paperback)

Shawn Everett Kantor

ISBN 10: 0226423778 / ISBN 13: 9780226423777

Published by The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, 1998

About this Item

Paperback. After the American Civil War, agricultural reformers in the South called for an end to unrestricted grazing of livestock on unfenced land. They advocated the stock law, which required livestock owners to fence in their animals, arguing that the existing system (in which farmers built protective fences around crops) was outdated and inhibited economic growth. The reformers steadily won their battles, and by the end of the century the range was on the way to being closed.In this original study, Kantor uses economic analysis to show that, contrary to traditional historical interpretation, this conflict was centered on anticipated benefits from fencing livestock rather than on class, cultural, or ideological differences. Kantor proves that the stock law brought economic benefits; at the same time, he analyzes why the law's adoption was hindered in many areas where it would have increased wealth. This argument illuminates the dynamics of real-world institutional change, where transactions are often costly and where some inefficient institutions persist while others give way to economic growth. After the American Civil War, agricultural reformers in the South called for an end to unrestricted grazing of livestock on unfenced land. Shawn Kantor asserts that this conflict was centered on anticipated benefits from fencing livestock rather than on class, cultural or ideological differences. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability.

Seller Inventory # 9780226423777

Bibliographic Details

• Title: Politics and Property Rights (Paperback)
• Publisher: The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL
• Publication Date: 1998
• Language: English
• ISBN 10: 0226423778
• ISBN 13: 9780226423777
• Binding: Paperback
• Condition: new

About this title

Synopsis

After the American Civil War, agricultural reformers in the South called for an end to unrestricted grazing of livestock on unfenced land. They advocated the stock law, which required livestock owners to fence in their animals, arguing that the existing system (in which farmers built protective fences around crops) was outdated and inhibited economic growth. The reformers steadily won their battles, and by the end of the century the range was on the way to being closed.

In this original study, Kantor uses economic analysis to show that, contrary to traditional historical interpretation, this conflict was centered on anticipated benefits from fencing livestock rather than on class, cultural, or ideological differences. Kantor proves that the stock law brought economic benefits; at the same time, he analyzes why the law's adoption was hindered in many areas where it would have increased wealth. This argument illuminates the dynamics of real-world institutional change, where transactions are often costly and where some inefficient institutions persist while others give way to economic growth.

About the Author

Shawn Everett Kantor is associate professor of economics and public administration and policy at the University of Arizona and a research associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research.