Probability and Inductive Logic

Eagle, Antony

ISBN 10: 1009507583 / ISBN 13: 9781009507585

Published by Cambridge University Press, 2025

About this Item

Zustand: Hervorragend | Sprache: Englisch | Produktart: Bücher | Reasoning from inconclusive evidence, or 'induction', is central to science and any applications we make of it. For that reason alone it demands the attention of philosophers of science. This element explores the prospects of using probability theory to provide an inductive logic: a framework for representing evidential support. Constraints on the ideal evaluation of hypotheses suggest that the overall standing of a hypothesis is represented by its probability in light of the total evidence, and incremental support, or confirmation, indicated by the hypothesis having a higher probability conditional on some evidence than it does unconditionally. This proposal is shown to have the capacity to reconstruct many canons of the scientific method and inductive inference. Along the way, significant objections are discussed, such as the challenge of inductive scepticism, and the objection that the probabilistic approach makes evidential support arbitrary.

Seller Inventory # 43052939/1

Bibliographic Details

• Title: Probability and Inductive Logic
• Publisher: Cambridge University Press
• Publication Date: 2025
• Language: English
• ISBN 10: 1009507583
• ISBN 13: 9781009507585
• Binding: Hardcover
• Condition: Hervorragend
• Seller catalogs:
  • Bücher

About this title

Synopsis

Reasoning from inconclusive evidence, or 'induction', is central to science and any applications we make of it. For that reason alone it demands the attention of philosophers of science. This element explores the prospects of using probability theory to provide an inductive logic: a framework for representing evidential support. Constraints on the ideal evaluation of hypotheses suggest that the overall standing of a hypothesis is represented by its probability in light of the total evidence, and incremental support, or confirmation, indicated by the hypothesis having a higher probability conditional on some evidence than it does unconditionally. This proposal is shown to have the capacity to reconstruct many canons of the scientific method and inductive inference. Along the way, significant objections are discussed, such as the challenge of inductive scepticism, and the objection that the probabilistic approach makes evidential support arbitrary.