Probability, Objectivity and Evidence (Hardcover)

F.C. Benenson

ISBN 10: 104110801X / ISBN 13: 9781041108016

Published by Taylor & Francis Ltd, London, 2025

About this Item

Hardcover. First published in 1984, in Probability, Objectivity and Evidence the author claims that the theory of probability provides a single, correct, analysis of probability and that the concept of probability employed in science can best be understood as that of inductive probability; to do so, it is necessary to show both how the logical relation theory of probability can be given a formulation sufficiently objective for the purposes of science, and how other attempts to explain the objective character of probability judgements are unsatisfactory.These and related questions occupy the first five chapters of the book. The last two chapters contain more or less independent material on the principle of indifference. The author argues that in essence, the logical relation theory alone can explain how we have objective knowledge of probabilities, and so it alone provides a viable system translation of the concept of probability used in science. This is a must read for students of logic and philosophy. First published in 1984, in Probability, Objectivity and Evidence the author claims that the theory of probability provides a single, correct, analysis of probability. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our Sydney, NSW warehouse or from our UK or US warehouse, depending on stock availability.

Seller Inventory # 9781041108016

Bibliographic Details

• Title: Probability, Objectivity and Evidence (Hardcover)
• Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd, London
• Publication Date: 2025
• Language: English
• ISBN 10: 104110801X
• ISBN 13: 9781041108016
• Binding: Hardcover
• Condition: new

About this title

Synopsis

First published in 1984, in Probability, Objectivity and Evidence the author claims that the theory of probability provides a single, correct, analysis of probability and that the concept of probability employed in science can best be understood as that of inductive probability; to do so, it is necessary to show both how the logical relation theory of probability can be given a formulation sufficiently objective for the purposes of science, and how other attempts to explain the objective character of probability judgements are unsatisfactory.

These and related questions occupy the first five chapters of the book. The last two chapters contain more or less independent material on the principle of indifference. The author argues that in essence, the logical relation theory alone can explain how we have objective knowledge of probabilities, and so it alone provides a viable system translation of the concept of probability used in science. This is a must read for students of logic and philosophy.