A sharp, evidence-led examination of how the British Army’s administration works—and why it often doesn’t.
In The Problem of the Army, L. S. Amery analyzes the War Office’s unclear organization, the clash between field command and civilian control, and the consequences for national defense.
The book surveys how administration has evolved, where decisions get stalled, and how a more coherent, accountable structure could improve planning, manpower, and mobilization. It draws on historical episodes and official findings to argue that reform must come from reorganizing who makes and who approves key choices.
Readers will come away with a clear picture of reform concepts, the arguments for a board-style structure, and practical questions about leadership, delegation, and coordination at the highest levels of defense policy.
- See how departments interact and why unclear lines of responsibility hinder action.
- Understand the critique of centralized command in favor of coordinated, expert-led decision making.
- Learn about proposed reforms and why they mattered in past conflicts and defense planning.
- Explore the tensions between civilian oversight and military efficiency in a modern state.
Ideal for readers of military history, public policy, and organizational reform.