Proofs and Models in Philosophical Logic

Greg Restall

ISBN 10: 1009045385 / ISBN 13: 9781009045384

Published by Cambridge University Press, 2022

About this Item

Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - This Element is an introduction to recent work proofs and models in philosophical logic, with a focus on the semantic paradoxes the sorites paradox. It introduces and motivates different proof systems and different kinds of models for a range of logics, including classical logic, intuitionistic logic, a range of three-valued and four-valued logics, and substructural logics. It also compares and contrasts the different approaches to substructural treatments of the paradox, showing how the structural rules of contraction, cut and identity feature in paradoxical derivations. It then introduces model theoretic treatments of the paradoxes, including a simple fixed-point model construction which generates three-valued models for theories of truth, which can provide models for a range of different non-classical logics. The Element closes with a discussion of the relationship between proofs and models, arguing that both have their place in the philosophers' and logicians' toolkits.

Seller Inventory # 9781009045384

Bibliographic Details

• Title: Proofs and Models in Philosophical Logic
• Publisher: Cambridge University Press
• Publication Date: 2022
• Language: English
• ISBN 10: 1009045385
• ISBN 13: 9781009045384
• Binding: Taschenbuch
• Condition: Neu
• Dimensions: 229W x 152H x 6D millimeters 229 millimeters width by 152 millimeters height by 6 millimeters depth
• Weight: 148 grams

About this title

Synopsis

This Element is an introduction to recent work proofs and models in philosophical logic, with a focus on the semantic paradoxes the sorites paradox. It introduces and motivates different proof systems and different kinds of models for a range of logics, including classical logic, intuitionistic logic, a range of three-valued and four-valued logics, and substructural logics. It also compares and contrasts the different approaches to substructural treatments of the paradox, showing how the structural rules of contraction, cut and identity feature in paradoxical derivations. It then introduces model theoretic treatments of the paradoxes, including a simple fixed-point model construction which generates three-valued models for theories of truth, which can provide models for a range of different non-classical logics. The Element closes with a discussion of the relationship between proofs and models, arguing that both have their place in the philosophers' and logicians' toolkits.