Purpose and Procedure in Philosophy of Perception

Contemporary philosophy of perception is dominated by highly polarized debates. The polarization is particularly acute in the debate between naïve realist disjunctivists and their opponents, but divisions seem almost as stark in other areas of dispute, for example, the debate over whether we experience so-called 'high-level' properties, and the debate concerning individuation of the senses. The guiding hypothesis underlying this volume is that such polarization stems from insufficient attention to how we should go about settling these debates. In general, there is widespread, largely implicit disagreement concerning what philosophical theories of perception are supposed to explain, the claims that we should hold fixed in the course of theorizing, and the methods that such theorizing should employ. The goal of this volume is to move such methodological questions from the background to the front of the debate, in the hope of facilitating progress. The contributions constitute an initial effort to spur more explicit, systematic discussion of methodology in philosophy of perception, covering a wide range of relevant topics, from the relation between scientific and philosophical theorizing about perception, to lessons we can learn from the history of philosophy of perception.

Heather Logue, Associate Professor of Philosophy, University of Leeds,Louise Richardson, Senior Lecturer in Philosophy, University of York

Heather Logue completed a BPhil in philosophy with a certificate in women's studies at the University of Pittsburgh in 2003. She joined the philosophy department at the University of Leeds in 2009 after completing her PhD at MIT, and she was promoted to Associate Professor in 2016.

Louise Richardson joined the Department of Philosophy at the University of York in 2012. She was previously a Junior Research Fellow at Christ Church, Oxford. She did her PhD in Warwick and her MA and undergraduate degree (both in Philosophy) in Durham.