Real Hallucinations: Psychiatric Illness, Intentionality, and the Interpersonal World (Philosophical Psychopathology)

Ratcliffe, Matthew

ISBN 10: 0262036711 / ISBN 13: 9780262036719

Published by The MIT Press, 2017

About this Item

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Bibliographic Details

• Title: Real Hallucinations: Psychiatric Illness, Intentionality, and the Interpersonal World (Philosophical Psychopathology)
• Publisher: The MIT Press
• Publication Date: 2017
• Language: English
• ISBN 10: 0262036711
• ISBN 13: 9780262036719
• Binding: hardcover
• Condition: Fine

About this title

Synopsis

A philosophical account of the structure of experience and how it depends on interpersonal relations, developed through a study of auditory verbal hallucinations and thought insertion.

In Real Hallucinations, Matthew Ratcliffe offers a philosophical examination of the structure of human experience, its vulnerability to disruption, and how it is shaped by relations with other people. He focuses on the seemingly simple question of how we manage to distinguish among our experiences of perceiving, remembering, imagining, and thinking. To answer this question, he first develops a detailed analysis of auditory verbal hallucinations (usually defined as hearing a voice in the absence of a speaker) and thought insertion (somehow experiencing one's own thoughts as someone else's). He shows how thought insertion and many of those experiences labeled as “hallucinations” consist of disturbances in a person's sense of being in one type of intentional state rather than another.

Ratcliffe goes on to argue that such experiences occur against a backdrop of less pronounced but wider-ranging alterations in the structure of intentionality. In so doing, he considers forms of experience associated with trauma, schizophrenia, and profound grief.

The overall position arrived at is that experience has an essentially temporal structure, involving patterns of anticipation and fulfillment that are specific to types of intentional states and serve to distinguish them phenomenologically. Disturbances of this structure can lead to various kinds of anomalous experience. Importantly, anticipation-fulfillment patterns are sustained, regulated, and disrupted by interpersonal experience and interaction. It follows that the integrity of human experience, including the most basic sense of self, is inseparable from how we relate to other people and to the social world as a whole.

About the Author

Matthew Ratcliffe is Professor for Theoretical Philosophy at the University of Vienna. He is author of Experiences of Depression, Feelings of Being, and Rethinking Commonsense Psychology.