Redefining European Economic Governance

The global financial crisis and sovereign debt crisis exposed the inadequacy of European economic governance. Despite the multitude of new mechanisms and institutions that have arisen over the last few years, many contend that economic governance remains inadequate and the EU must integrate even further to calm still-volatile markets. A tension exists between creating effective instruments that will not overstep the authority delegated to an EU that has integrated economically but not politically. Can the EU’s economic governance system satisfy the demands of markets and politics? Relevant issues include the ability of supranational institutions to dictate policy to national governments, the harmonization of economic policies and institutions across Europe, and a substantial increase in the transfer of funds across borders. Can monetary union continue without political union? How will the new institutions alter the distribution of power between EU institutions as well as between member states?

This edited volume analyzes the major policy challenges and institutional mechanisms at the EU- and international levels to combat the global financial crisis and the EU’s sovereign debt crisis such as financial integration, fiscal cooperation, and the rising power of the ECB.

This book was published as a special issue of the Journal of European Integration.

Michele Chang (College of Europe), Georg Menz (Goldsmiths University of London) and Mitchell P. Smith (University of Oklahoma) are former co-chairs of the European Union Studies Association’s Political Economy Interest Section.