The Reference Error - UK Edition: Why the Problem of Consciousness Is Not a Problem (PHILOSOPHY OF MIND FOR EVERYONE)

A., Kheprias

ISBN 13: 9798251831153

Published by Independently published, 2026

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Bibliographic Details

• Title: The Reference Error - UK Edition: Why the Problem of Consciousness Is Not a Problem (PHILOSOPHY OF MIND FOR EVERYONE)
• Publisher: Independently published
• Publication Date: 2026
• Language: English
• ISBN 13: 9798251831153
• Binding: Soft cover
• Condition: New

About this title

Synopsis

The Reference Error
Why the Problem of Consciousness Is Not a Problem
T-Reality Series — Volume 2
The Ontological Domain

What is consciousness, and what do neuroscience and cognitive science actually explain when they describe it

Over the past decades, philosophy of mind, theoretical neuroscience, and cognitive science have developed increasingly precise models of brain function. Researchers such as Karl Friston, Thomas Metzinger, David Marr, Andy Clark, and David Chalmers have demonstrated that the brain operates through generative models that actively construct perception, cognition, and the self.

Yet a fundamental question remains unresolved. What is the relationship between these scientific models and the operational structure of cognitive experience itself

This book provides a rigorous interdisciplinary analysis of this question. It demonstrates that the problem of consciousness emerges from a structural distinction between scientific description and the operational domain of the cognitive system. Neuroscience describes neural activity. Cognitive science formalizes computational processes. Philosophy of mind analyzes representational structure. But the cognitive system itself operates through internally generated generative models that define its operational reality.

This volume explains

the role of generative models in cognition
the structure of predictive processing
the emergence of the self-model in cognitive systems
the relationship between neural activity and cognitive representation
the ontological structure of cognitive reality
the scientific status of consciousness in contemporary neuroscience
the methodological distinction between scientific models and operational cognitive content

Building on the foundational work of Karl Friston, Thomas Metzinger, David Marr, Andy Clark, and David Chalmers, this book provides a clear and systematic framework for understanding consciousness within the structure of modern cognitive science.

T-Reality is a fifteen-volume interdisciplinary research project integrating philosophy of mind, neuroscience, computational neuroscience, and cognitive science to examine consciousness as an emergent property of generative cognitive systems.

This book is ideal for readers interested in

philosophy of mind
cognitive science
neuroscience
consciousness studies
predictive processing
self-model theory
generative models
computational neuroscience
neurophilosophy