Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis: Revised to Include New Revelations from Soviet & Cuban Souces (Revised)

Garthoff, Raymond

ISBN 10: 0815730535 / ISBN 13: 9780815730538

Published by Brookings Institution Press, 1989

About this Item

Contains some, or all, of the following: highlights, notes, and underlining. Edge wear. Open Books is a nonprofit social venture that provides literacy experiences for thousands of readers each year through inspiring programs and creative capitalization of books.

Seller Inventory # mon0000830705

Bibliographic Details

• Title: Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis: Revised to Include New Revelations from Soviet & Cuban Souces (Revised)
• Publisher: Brookings Institution Press
• Publication Date: 1989
• Language: English
• ISBN 10: 0815730535
• ISBN 13: 9780815730538
• Binding: Paperback
• Condition: Acceptable

About this title

Synopsis

The Soviet response to the first edition of Reflections has been a prime example of the new openness under glasnost in discussing previously taboo subjects. Using new revelations such as the fact that Moscow had twice as many troops in Cuba as the Kennedy administration believed from key Soviet and Cuban Sources, Garthoff has revised his earlier analysis to produce the most accurate, eye-opening story yet of the 1963 crisis. In this book Raymond L. Garthoff, a participant in the crisis deliberations of the U.S. government, reflects on the nature of the crisis, it's consequences, and it's lessons for the future. He provides a unique combination of memoir, historical analysis, and political interpretations. He gives particular attention to the aftermath and "afterlife" of the crisis and to its bearing on current and future policy. In the first edition of the book in 1987 the Garthoff presented a number of facts for the first time. Since then, more information has become available, particularly form Soviet sources, in part from conferences in which Garthoff participated but even more from individual interviews and research. This new information, much of it presented here in this volume for the first time, helps to fill in gaps in our knowledge about events and motivations on the Soviet side. More importantly, it enlarges our understanding of the crisis interaction.