The Regional Roots of Developmental Politics in India: A Divided Leviathan

India is widely regarded as the most celebrated case of a"failed" developmental state, seemingly the exception that belies theprediction of a triumphant Asian century. Its central political and economicinstitutions have been variously characterized as both "soft" and"strong" -- at once weak, predatory, and interventionist. Aseema Sinhapresents an innovative model that questions conventional views of economicdevelopment by showing that the Indian state is a divided leviathan: itsdevelopmental failure is the combined product of central-local interactions andpolitical choices by regional elites. To develop this disaggregated model, sheexamines three regional states with sharply divergent development trajectories: Gujarat, West Bengal, and Tamil Nadu. Drawing on recent work in comparativepolitical economy, the theory of nested games, incentive theory, and an ethnographicanalysis of business actors, this study directs analytical attention at the creationof micro-institutions at the subnational level, explores the role of provinces inshaping investment flows, and considers the role of federalism as a mediatinginstitution shaping the vertical strategies of provinces. A comparative chapterapplies the model to data from China, Brazil, Russia, and the former SovietUnion.