Regulation Versus Litigation

Daniel P. Kessler (Ed.)

ISBN 10: 0226432203 / ISBN 13: 9780226432205

Published by The University of Chicago Press, 2012

About this Item

Focusing on the costs and benefits of two important instruments of economic policy, this title explores the trade-offs between litigation and regulation, the circumstances in which one approach may outperform the other, and the principles that affect the choice between addressing particular economic activities with one system or the other. Editor(s): Kessler, Daniel P. Series: National Bureau of Economic Research Conference Report. Num Pages: 344 pages, 19 line drawings, 54 tables. BIC Classification: KCP; LBBM. Category: (G) General (US: Trade). Dimension: 229 x 152 x 20. Weight in Grams: 503. . 2012. Reprint. Paperback. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.

Seller Inventory # V9780226432205

Bibliographic Details

• Title: Regulation Versus Litigation
• Publisher: The University of Chicago Press
• Publication Date: 2012
• Language: English
• ISBN 10: 0226432203
• ISBN 13: 9780226432205
• Binding: Soft cover
• Condition: New

About this title

Synopsis

 

The efficacy of various political institutions is the subject of intense debate between proponents of broad legislative standards enforced through litigation and those who prefer regulation by administrative agencies. This book explores the trade-offs between litigation and regulation, the circumstances in which one approach may outperform the other, and the principles that affect the choice between addressing particular economic activities with one system or the other. Combining theoretical analysis with empirical investigation in a range of industries, including public health, financial markets, medical care, and workplace safety, Regulation versus Litigation sheds light on the costs and benefits of two important instruments of economic policy.

About the Author

 

Daniel P. Kessler is a professor at the Law School and Graduate School of Business, Stanford University; a senior fellow at Stanford's Hoover Institution; and a research associate of the NBER.