Resolving Insurgencies

Understanding how insurgencies may be brought to a successful conclusion is vital to military strategists and policymakers. This study examines how past insurgencies have ended and how current ones may be resolved. Four ways in which insurgencies have ended are identified. Clear-cut victories for either the government or the insurgents occurred during the era of decolonization, but they seldom happen today. Recent insurgencies have often degenerated into criminal organizations that become committed to making money rather than fighting a revolution, or they evolve into terrorist groups capable of nothing more than sporadic violence. In a few cases, the threatened government has resolved the conflict by co-opting the insurgents. After achieving a strategic stalemate and persuading the belligerents that they have nothing to gain from continued fighting, these governments have drawn the insurgents into the legitimate political process through reform and concessions. The author concludes that such a co-option strategy offers the best hope of U.S. success in Afghanistan and in future counterinsurgency campaigns. :Historians and political scientists, especially military strategists will be interested in this text that reviews several key factors to recent insurgencies. Keywords: Afghanistan; Iraq; General Petraeus; Us Department of Defense (Dod); Us Department of Army; Us Army; Army strategists; Al-Qaeda; military strategy; historians;United States (U.S./Us); terrorist groups;

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

THOMAS R. MOCKAITIS is Professor of History at DePaul University. He team-teaches terrorism and counterterrorism courses internationally with other experts through the Center for Civil-Military Relations at the Naval Post-Graduate School. He was the 2004 Eisenhower Chair at the Royal Military Academy of the Netherlands. He has also lectured at the NATO School, the U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College, and the Canadian Forces Staff College, and presented papers at the Pearson Peacekeeping Center (Canada), the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst (UK), and the Austrian National Defense Academy. A frequent media commentator on terrorism and security matters, Dr. Mockaitis has provided commentary on Public Television, National Public Radio, BBC World News, all major Chicago TV stations, and various local radio programs. He appears regularly as a terrorism expert for WGN-TV News. He is the 2008 recipient of the DePaul Liberal Arts and Sciences Cortelyou-Lowery Award for Excellence in Teaching, Scholarship, and Service. Dr. Mockaitis is the author of Iraq and the Challenge of Counterinsurgency (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2008), The “New” Terrorism: Myths and Reality (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2007), The Iraq War: Learning from the Past, Adapting to the Present, and Preparing for the Future (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2007), Peacekeeping and Intrastate Conflict: the Sword or the Olive Branch? (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999), British Counterinsurgency in the Post-Imperial Era (Manchester, UK: University of Manchester Press, 1995), and British Counterinsurgency: 1919-1960 (London, UK: Macmillan, 1990). 

He co-edited Grand Strategy and the War on Terrorism with Paul Rich, (London, UK: Frank Cass, 2003) and The Future of Peace Operations: Old Challenges for a New Century with Erwin Schmidl (a special issue of Small Wars and Insurgencies, London, UK: Taylor and Francis 2004). He is an editor of Small Wars and Insurgencies and has also published numerous articles on unconventional conflict. His most recent book, a biography of Osama bin Laden, was published by Greenwood in early 2010. Dr. Mockaitis earned his B.A. in European history from Allegheny College, and his M.A. and Ph.D. in modern British and Irish history from the University of Wisconsin-Madison.