Securing the U.S. Defense Information Infrastructure : A Proposed Approach

It is widely believed, and increasingly documented, that the United States is vulnerable to various types of information warfare attacks. Threats range from nuisance attacks by hackers to those potentially putting national security at risk. The latter might include attacks on essential U.S. information systems in a major regional crisis or theater war. The purpose might be to deter (or coerce) a U.S. intervention, to degrade U.S. power projection capabilities, to punish the United States or its allies, or to undermine the support of the American public for the conflict. Critical command-and-control and intelligence systems are designed to be robust and secure under attack. However, their survivability cannot be taken for granted, and they depend on a diverse, primarily civilian and commercial, information infrastructure (consisting of the Internet and the public telephone network, among other elements). As the diversity and potential seriousness of threats to the U.S. information infrastructure have become apparent, national-security planners and analysts have begun to think of ways to counter such threats--to increase the infrastructure's availability for essential functions. The authors analyze the concept of a minimum essential information infrastructure (MEII) in light of the characteristics of the national information infrastructure and the nature of the threat. They suggest that it is useful to think of the MEII as a process rather than a hardened stand-alone structure, and they provide a methodology and a tool to support the implementation of that process by military units and other organizations.

Robert H. Anderson (Ph.D., Applied Mathematics, Harvard University) is a Senior Information Scientist at RAND. Research areas include social implications of the information revolution; security and safety of internetted networks; computer languages and support environments for modeling and simulation; human-computer interface; use of computers for C3I and defense

Phillip Feldman (PhD, Electrical Engineering, University of Southern California) is a Senior Engineer at RAND. Research interests include performance and survivability of information systems, military use of commercial technology, circuit-switched and packet-switched networks, communications satellites, telecommunications and computer networks, throughput/delay analyses, communications link design and analysis, and electronic warfare.

Scott Andrew Gerwehr (PhD, International Relations, University of California Los Angeles; PhD Program RAND Graduate School of Policy Analysis, Santa Monica, CA) is a Political Scientist at RAND. Research interests include Deception/Counterdeception in the areas of Social & Cognitive Psychology, Biology & Animal Behavior, Organized Crime, Confidence Artists, Politics & International Relations, Military History, Terrorism, Insurgency, and Guerrilla Warfare.

RICHARD MESIC (M.S., D.A.G.S., Probability and Statistics, Michigan State University) is a RAND senior staff member, Defense Planning and Analysis Department.

Jeff Rothenberg (M.S., Computer Sciences, University of Wisconsin) is a Senior Computer Scientist at RAND. Research Interests include the impact of information technology on record-keeping and developing ways of ensuring the longevity of digital records and documents. The fundamental nature of modeling and developing a theory of modeling as a primary cognitive activity. Issues of data quality and techniques for evaluating and recording the quality of data. Using advanced modeling, AI and simulation for decision support, emphasizing end-user interaction and clarity of representation.

James Chiesa (M.S., Environmental Science , Indiana University; M.A., Zoology , Indiana University) is a Communications Analyst at RAND.