Self-fulfilling Speculative Attacks and Informational Structure

Rati Mekvabishvili

ISBN 10: 384655569X / ISBN 13: 9783846555699

Published by LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing Nov 2011, 2011

About this Item

Neuware -This paper presents an experiment designed to test the self-fulfilling currency crisis models and to examine the impact of public information in context of a signal. Our experiment extends the experimental investigation of Heinemann et al (2002) and Cornand (2004) and compares precise public and noisy public information treatments. Our analysis of the theoretical and the previous experimental results suggests that noisy public information is unlikely to have destabilising effects. In this case we expect that probability of attacks to be lower and predictability of attacks may be worse with noisy public information than with precise public information. Based on Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Koszegi and Rabin (2006), we also propose an explanation of the order effect of the certain payoffs found in the previous experiments.Books on Demand GmbH, Überseering 33, 22297 Hamburg 60 pp. Englisch.

Seller Inventory # 9783846555699

Bibliographic Details

• Title: Self-fulfilling Speculative Attacks and Informational Structure
• Publisher: LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing Nov 2011
• Publication Date: 2011
• Language: English
• ISBN 10: 384655569X
• ISBN 13: 9783846555699
• Binding: Taschenbuch
• Condition: Neu
• Dimensions: 220W x 150H x 4D millimeters 220 millimeters width by 150 millimeters height by 4 millimeters depth
• Weight: 107 grams

About this title

Synopsis

This paper presents an experiment designed to test the self-fulfilling currency crisis models and to examine the impact of public information in context of a signal. Our experiment extends the experimental investigation of Heinemann et al (2002) and Cornand (2004) and compares precise public and noisy public information treatments. Our analysis of the theoretical and the previous experimental results suggests that noisy public information is unlikely to have destabilising effects. In this case we expect that probability of attacks to be lower and predictability of attacks may be worse with noisy public information than with precise public information. Based on Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Koszegi and Rabin (2006), we also propose an explanation of the order effect of the certain payoffs found in the previous experiments.

About the Author

Mr. Mekvabishvili holds a Master of Science degree in Behavioural Economics from the University of Nottingham. Before continuing his studies in the United Kingdom, he spent one academic year at the University of Copenhagen. Mr. Mekvabishvili also holds Master’s and Bachelor’s degrees in Economics from Charles University in Prague.