From Shield to Storm: High-Tech Weapons, Military Strategy, and Coalition Warfare in the Persian GU

Military analysts outline the weapons, strategy, motives, and miscalculations of Operation Desert Storm with accounts that were not reported in the media

By the authors of A Quick and Dirty Guide to War , this in-depth yet succinct account of the causes of the Persian Gulf war and how it was fought is of great interest. In their analysis of the 42-day air campaign ("Never in the history of warfare has air power played such a determining role in wining a war") and the four-day battle that climaxed Desert Storm in late February 1991, Dunnigan and Bay discuss the strategy, tactics and operational problems on both sides of the battlefront. They also offer informed and unequivocal judgments on the high-tech weaponry tested in the campaign: the Abrams tank, the Apache helicopter, the Bradley Fighting Vehicle "exceeded all expectation." The book explores the ratio of friendly-fire casualties, the performance of female GIs in the field, the reaction of journalists to war-zone restrictions, and other issues of concern to the general reader.
Copyright 1991 Reed Business Information, Inc.

A savvy, slick, and comprehensive overview of the Gulf War, from the authors of A Quick and Dirty Guide to War (1984). Dunnigan (coauthor, Shooting Blanks, p. 768, etc.) and Bay offer a wealth of fresh perspectives on the confrontation, commencing with an evenhanded evaluation of its ancient roots. Moving on to the casus belli, they review the industrial West's unwontedly cooperative response to Saddam Hussein's annexation of his tiny, oil-rich neighbor by force of arms. The stage thus set, the authors provide a perceptive audit of the logistics that put Saddam's occupation troops between Iraq and a hard place. They go on to deliver detailed briefings on the dramatic air and ground campaigns as well as background on how the two were integrated. Covered as well are largely overlooked naval operations that, among other fruitful outcomes, kept 17,000 Iraqi soldiers tied down awaiting an amphibious invasion that never came. Along their frequently sardonic way, Dunnigan and Bay furnish large amounts of statistical data on orders of battle, plus illuminating rundowns on how the equipment, weapons, and tactics employed by both sides helped determine victory or defeat. Once the Soviet-tutored Iraqis lost their centralized communications system to aerial attacks, the authors point out, they proved comparatively easy pickings for coalition forces that had greater firepower as well as superior sensors--and access to intelligence from American satellites. Dunnigan and Bay also make responsible estimates of unreported desertion and casualty rates--e.g., pegging Iraqi KIAs at no more than 35,000. Nor do they neglect the home front, recalling with evident relish lawmakers' less than prescient predictions in the debate preceding hostilities, and the often inane commentary of TV's talking heads. A down-to-earth wrap-up: fine fare for general readers as well as armchair strategists. (Charts, diagrams, line drawings, and maps--not seen.) -- Copyright ©1991, Kirkus Associates, LP. All rights reserved.

Dunnigan, best known as a designer of sophisticated war games, and journalist Bay provide an overview of force structures, strategies, and operational performances in the Middle East between August 1990 and March 1991. The authors emphasize such by-now familiar points as the importance of high-tech weapons in a desert environment, the years of training and preparation successfully applied by a U.S. military determined to overcome the legacy of Vietnam, and the decisive role of air power. They conclude with a broad spectrum of provocative possible future scenarios for the Middle East. However, their book is poorly organized, with chapters skipping from subject to subject almost at random, and they fail to offer much technical information beyond that already available in sources like Frank Chadwick's Gulf War Fact Book (GDW Games, dist. by Berkley, 1991). Norman Friedman's Desert Victory (Naval Inst. Pr., 1991) is a better choice.
- D.E. Showalter, U.S. Air Force Acad., Colorado Springs
Copyright 1991 Reed Business Information, Inc.