Social Choice and Multicriterion Decision-Making
Language: English
Published by Mit Pr, 1986
- Hardcover
- Used

Seller: -OnTimeBooks-, Phoenix, AZ, U.S.A.-OnTimeBooks-
5-star seller
AbeBooks seller since March 9, 2023
Hardcover
Condition: Used - Good
US$ 33.45
Free Shipping
Ships within U.S.A.
Quantity: 1 available
Add to basketFree 30-day returns
Item description from seller
A copy that has been read, remains in good condition. All pages are intact, and the cover is intact. The spine and cover show signs of wear. Pages can include notes and highlighting and show signs of wear, and the copy can include "From the library of" labels or previous owner inscriptions. 100% GUARANTEE! Shipped with delivery confirmation, if you're not satisfied with purchase please return item! Ships via media mail.
Seller Inventory # OTV.0262010879.G
- Title
- Social Choice and Multicriterion Decision-Making
- Author
- Kenneth J. Arrow; Herve Raynaud
- Publisher
- Mit Pr
- Publication year
- 1986
- Condition
- good
- Binding
- Hardcover
- Language
- English
- ISBN 10
- 0262010879
- ISBN 13
- 9780262010870
This study comes to grips with the industrial outranking problem, one of the major outstanding problems of current operations research and managerial decision-making.
The problem, simply stated, is this: given a large but finite set of criteria, and a large but finite number of alternatives, how can the criteria be ranked in priority order, and how should the alternatives be ranked from best to worst consistent with the ordering of criteria that may be conflicting or incommensurable?
There have been many proposed solutions to the problem. Numerous empirical recipes - among them the majority method - have been submitted, based in large part on the subjective judgments and biases of various observers.
The authors argue that the axiomatic formulation offers the surest path to a solution that is as objective as possible, minimally distorted by the unwitting imposition of personal values. They then develop a system of consistent and appealing axioms, confront the paradoxes that put axiomatic systems in general at risk, and demonstrate the applicability of their system to realistic industrial outranking problems.
Even within the axiomatic framework, however, some leeway remains for subjective choice and conscious value decisions. One ad hoc criterion of choice the authors selected was that their method should be neither so flexible and open that personal biases might easily slip in, nor so artificially rigid that the play of intuition and creativity was systematically excluded.
The book also takes a hard look at the theoretical and practical defects of the majority method, the favored proposed solution, and at such associated issues as committee decision techniques, strategic majority voting; and restriction conditions.
Kenneth A. Arrow, who was awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics in 1972, is Joan Kenny Professor of Economics and Professor of Operations Research at Stanford University. Herve Raynaud is Professor, University of Grenoble, France.
The problem, simply stated, is this: given a large but finite set of criteria, and a large but finite number of alternatives, how can the criteria be ranked in priority order, and how should the alternatives be ranked from best to worst consistent with the ordering of criteria that may be conflicting or incommensurable?
There have been many proposed solutions to the problem. Numerous empirical recipes - among them the majority method - have been submitted, based in large part on the subjective judgments and biases of various observers.
The authors argue that the axiomatic formulation offers the surest path to a solution that is as objective as possible, minimally distorted by the unwitting imposition of personal values. They then develop a system of consistent and appealing axioms, confront the paradoxes that put axiomatic systems in general at risk, and demonstrate the applicability of their system to realistic industrial outranking problems.
Even within the axiomatic framework, however, some leeway remains for subjective choice and conscious value decisions. One ad hoc criterion of choice the authors selected was that their method should be neither so flexible and open that personal biases might easily slip in, nor so artificially rigid that the play of intuition and creativity was systematically excluded.
The book also takes a hard look at the theoretical and practical defects of the majority method, the favored proposed solution, and at such associated issues as committee decision techniques, strategic majority voting; and restriction conditions.
Kenneth A. Arrow, who was awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics in 1972, is Joan Kenny Professor of Economics and Professor of Operations Research at Stanford University. Herve Raynaud is Professor, University of Grenoble, France.
"Synopsis" may belong to another edition of this title.
About the Author
Kenneth J. Arrow, who was awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics in 1972, is Joan Kenny Professor of Economics and Professor of Operations Research at Stanford University.
"About the title" may belong to another edition of this title.
-OnTimeBooks-
Phoenix, AZ, U.S.A.
5-star seller
AbeBooks seller since March 9, 2023
Shipping rates within U.S.A.
| Item | 3 to 8 business days | 2 to 6 business days |
|---|---|---|
| First item | US$ 0.00 | US$ 3.99 |
Payment methods
Specialty
Used books of all typesSeller's business information
BookDrop LLC
601 S 54th Ave, STE 101
Phoenix, AZ U.S.A. 85043