Spectrum Auctions and Competition in Telecommunications

ISBN 10: 0262090376 / ISBN 13: 9780262090377

Published by MIT Press, 2003

About this Item

Former library copy. Pages intact with minimal writing/highlighting. The binding may be loose and creased. Dust jackets/supplements are not included. Includes library markings. Stock photo provided. Product includes identifying sticker. Better World Books: Buy Books. Do Good.

Seller Inventory # 15645209-6

Bibliographic Details

• Title: Spectrum Auctions and Competition in Telecommunications
• Publisher: MIT Press
• Publication Date: 2003
• Language: English
• ISBN 10: 0262090376
• ISBN 13: 9780262090377
• Binding: Hardcover
• Condition: Good
• Weight: 1.272 pounds

About this title

Synopsis

Leading experts in industrial organization and auction theory examine the recent European telecommunication license auction experience.

In 2000 and 2001, several European countries carried out auctions for third generation technologies or universal mobile telephone services (UMTS) communication licenses. These spectrum auctions inaugurated yet another era in an industry that has already been transformed by a combination of staggering technological innovation and substantial regulatory change. Because of their spectacular but often puzzling outcomes, these spectrum auctions attracted enormous attention and invited new research on the interplay of auctions, industry dynamics, and regulation. This book collects essays on this topic by leading analysts of telecommunications and the European auction experience, all but one presented at a November 2001 CESifo conference; comments and responses are included as well, to preserve some of the controversy and atmosphere of give-and-take at the conference.The essays show the interconnectedness of two important and productive areas of modern economics, auction theory and industrial organization. Because spectrum auctions are embedded in a dynamic interaction of consumers, firms, legislation, and regulation, a multidimensional approach yields important insights. The first essays discuss strategies of stimulating new competition and the complex interplay of the political process, regulation, and competition. The later essays focus on specific spectrum auctions. Combining the empirical data these auctions provide with recent advances in microeconomic theory, they examine questions of auction design and efficiency and convincingly explain the enormous variation of revenues in different auctions.

About the Authors

Gerhard Illing is Professor of Economics at the University of Munich. He is the coeditor of Spectrum Auctions and Competition in Telecommunications (MIT Press, 2004).

Ulrich Klü h is Assistant Lecturer in the Department of Economics at Ludwig Maximilian University, Munich.