Stifling Political Competition: How Government Has Rigged the System to Benefit Demopublicans and Exclude Third Parties: Vol 12

Bennett, James T./ Schuck, Peter/ Beiglbock, W.

ISBN 10: 0387098208 / ISBN 13: 9780387098203

Published by Springer Verlag, 2008

About this Item

1st edition. 144 pages. 9.40x6.30x0.50 inches. In Stock.

Seller Inventory # x-0387098208

Bibliographic Details

• Title: Stifling Political Competition: How Government Has Rigged the System to Benefit Demopublicans and Exclude Third Parties: Vol 12
• Publisher: Springer Verlag
• Publication Date: 2008
• Language: English
• ISBN 10: 0387098208
• ISBN 13: 9780387098203
• Binding: Hardcover
• Condition: Brand New
• Weight: 0.36 kilograms

About this title

Synopsis

Stifling Political Competition examines the history and array of laws, regulations, subsidies and programs that benefit the two major parties and discourage even the possibility of a serious challenge to the Democrat-Republican duopoly. The analysis synthesizes political science, economics and American history to demonstrate how the two-party system is the artificial creation of a network of laws, restrictions and subsidies that favor the Democrats and Republicans and cripple potential challenges. The American Founders, as it has been generally forgotten, distrusted political parties. Nowhere in the U.S. Constitution are parties mentioned, much less given legal protection or privilege. This provocative book traces how by the end of the Civil War the Republicans and Democrats had guaranteed their dominance and subsequently influenced a range of policies developed to protect the duopoly. For example, Bennett examines how the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (as amended in 1974 and 1976), which was sold to the public as a nonpartisan act of good government reformism actually reinforced the dominance of the two parties. While focused primarily on the American experience, the book does consider the prevalence of two-party systems around the world (especially in emerging democracies) and the widespread contempt with which they are often viewed. The concluding chapter considers the potential of truly radical reform toward opening the field to vigorous, lively, contentious third-party candidacies that might finally offer alienated voters a choice, not an echo.

About the Author

James T. Bennett is Eminent Scholar and William P. Snavely Professor of Political Economy and Public Policy at George Mason University.