Strategic Analysis of U.S. Special Operations During the Korean Conflict, 1950-1953 (Hardcover). This item is unavailable.

Language: English

Published by Hutson Street Press, 2025

1025070887 / 9781025070889

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Hardcover. This study analyzes the strategic effectiveness of special operations conducted by the Far East Command (FECOM) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in Korea during the Korean Conflict from 1950 to 1953. Each organization's effectiveness is determined by examining the areas of strategy, organization and operations. Each organization's effectiveness is determined by examining the areas of strategy, organization and operations. Special operations as defined in Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication Number 2, "Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAFF)" was the standard by which operations were selected for examination. The study answers four questions: 1) What were the U.N. Command strategic objectives within the Korean theater, and how did these change?, 2) How these changing strategic objectives development and coordination of special operations objectives, forces and headquarters?, 3) What did U.S. special operations in Korea accomplish strategically? 4) What conclusions can be drawn from U.S. special operations forces' effectiveness or ineffectiveness in Korea? FECOM special operations were limited to partisan operations and psychological operations. The partisans consisted of anti-communist North Koreans organized and led by U.S. cadre beginning in January, 1951. Psychological operations were conducted continuously from July, 1950 by a separate staff element whose capabilities expanded dramatically during the course of the conflict. CIA operations within Korea consisted of intelligence gathering and special (or covert) activities controlled from headquarters in Japan. CIA operations remained autonomous of FECOM control throughout the conflict. The control issue was the source of bureaucratic conflict that inhibited operational coordination between FECOM and CIA throughout the conflict.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability.…

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Title
Strategic Analysis of U.S. Special Operations During the Korean Conflict, 1950-1953 (Hardcover)
Author
Steve A. Fondacaro
Publisher
Hutson Street Press
Publication year
2025
Condition
new
Binding
Hardcover
Language
English
ISBN 10
1025070887
ISBN 13
9781025070889

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