A clear, concise look at how shareholders decide on takeover defenses and what that means for firm value.
This book develops a rational-choice model of how managers may request anticipatory defenses and how shareholders vote in the face of those requests. It explains why voting outcomes can sometimes leave shareholders worse off, even when they vote in what's traditionally seen as their best interest.
- Understand the distinction between anticipatory defenses (requested before a bid) and defensive responses (used during a bid) and how each affects takeover odds and firm value.
- See how the model links manager outside options, bidder strength, and shareholder welfare to voting outcomes.
- Learn why rational, informed shareholders might approve defenses that reduce wealth in some scenarios, and what signals those defenses send about management type.
- Explore the empirical implications for studying shareholder voting and the role of manager incentives in takeovers.
Ideal for readers of corporate governance, takeovers, and strategic voting in dense economic theory, this edition offers a compact, accessible framework that connects theory to observed voting patterns.