Understanding why shareholders may vote for anti-takeover defenses that can soften their gains.
This book develops a clear, game-theory‑based view of how managers use defenses to shape takeover outcomes and how shareholders decide to approve or reject them. It lays out a two-period model that links voting decisions to expected changes in firm value and the odds of a takeover bid.
In accessible terms, you’ll see how management can set the agenda, how approvals can alter incentives in the second period, and why the observed voting can be rational even when outcomes seem worse for shareholders. The analysis connects theory to empirical results and discusses when defenses might increase or reduce shareholder wealth.
- How anticipatory defenses influence the minimum bid and the chance of a takeover.
- Why shareholders may rationally vote for defenses to avoid worse outcomes later.
- The role of agenda setting and the real effects of proposed changes on firm value.
- Conditions under which anti-takeover devices can increase or decrease shareholder wealth.
Ideal for readers seeking a rigorous yet accessible treatment of corporate control, governance, and shareholder voting dynamics in the takeover market.