Getting Things Right : Fittingness, Reasons, and Value

Some of our attitudes are fitting, others unfitting. Fitting attitudes get things right. Conor McHugh and Jonathan Way argue that fittingness is the key to understanding the normative domain - the domain of reasons, obligations, and value. They argue that fittingness is a normatively basic property, on which all other normative properties depend.

Conor McHugh, University of Southampton, Jonathan Way, niversity of Southampton

Conor McHugh is Associate Professor in Philosophy at the University of Southampton. He has worked on a range of topics in epistemology, value theory, and philosophy of mind. These include the nature of belief and of attitudes more generally, normativity, reasons and reasoning, mental agency, doxastic non-voluntarism, and self-knowledge. He has published on these topics in leading journals such as Ethics, Mind, and Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. He is the co-editor, with Jonathan Way and Daniel Whiting, of Normativity: Epistemic and Practical (OUP, 2018) and Metaepistemology (OUP, 2018).

Jonathan Way is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Southampton. He works on a range of topics in ethics and epistemology. He is especially interested in questions about reasons, rationality, value, and normativity, across the epistemic, practical, and affective domains. He has published on these issues in leading journals such as Ethics, Mind, and Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. He is the co-editor, with Conor McHugh and Daniel Whiting, of Normativity: Epistemic and Practical (OUP, 2018) and Metaepistemology (OUP, 2018).