Thinking effects: Effects-based methodology for joint operations (CADRE paper)

Mann, Edward C

ISBN 10: 1585661120 / ISBN 13: 9781585661121

Published by Air University Press, 2002

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Bibliographic Details

• Title: Thinking effects: Effects-based methodology for joint operations (CADRE paper)
• Publisher: Air University Press
• Publication Date: 2002
• Language: English
• ISBN 10: 1585661120
• ISBN 13: 9781585661121
• Binding: paperback
• Condition: Very Good

About this title

Synopsis

The United States has a reputation for having the strongest military force in the world - perhaps even the best in history. Still we continue to struggle with force application in an era without the monolithic Soviet enemy. Out doctrine, written in a paradigm seeking "total victory," has been refined through World War II, Korea, Vietnam, and the Persian Gulf War. It has been assiduously adapted for major theater warfare and what can be called the conquest paradigm. We need to change. We need to adapt to a different world of continuing struggle between and within nation-states, one where military strength and political persuasion are applied with smarter flexibility. In Thinking Effects-Based Methodology for Joint Operations, Col. Edward C. Mann III, USAF, retired, Lt. Col. Gary Endersby, SUAF, retired, and Thomas R. Searle propose that military actions should be employed through effects-based operations (EBO). These authors have developed an extended explanation of EBO methodology earlier defined in an Air Combat Command white paper, "Effects-Based Operations." Challenged by the white paper to define procedures in the EBO methodology, they further codified the EBO way of thinking. Submitting that this methodology is extremely promising, they recognize two major areas of challenge. First, is modifying both service and joint doctrine to full articulate what can be accomplished with EBO. Second, there are major issues in the area of command and control (C2). Effective C2 for EBO depends on how intelligence analysis and combat assessment not only are performed but all integrated into the planning process.