Trade Policy Flexibility and Enforcement in the WTO (Paperback)

Simon A.B. Schropp

ISBN 10: 1107638186 / ISBN 13: 9781107638181

Published by Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2014

About this Item

Paperback. The World Trade Organization (WTO) is an incomplete contract among sovereign countries. Trade policy flexibility mechanisms are designed to deal with contractual gaps, which are the inevitable consequence of this contractual incompleteness. Trade policy flexibility mechanisms are backed up by enforcement instruments which allow for punishment of illegal extra-contractual conduct. This book offers a legal and economic analysis of contractual escape and punishment in the WTO. It assesses the interrelation between contractual incompleteness, trade policy flexibility mechanisms, contract enforcement, and WTO Members' willingness to co-operate and to commit to trade liberalization. It contributes to the body of WTO scholarship by providing a systematic assessment of the weaknesses of the current regime of escape and punishment in the WTO, and the systemic implications that these weaknesses have for the international trading system, before offering a reform agenda that is concrete, politically realistic, and systemically viable. This law and economics analysis of contractual escape and punishment in the WTO assesses existing escape and punishment mechanisms, explores the systemic implications of flaws (in the international trading system), and offers a reform agenda that is concrete, politically realistic, and systemically viable. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability.

Seller Inventory # 9781107638181

Bibliographic Details

• Title: Trade Policy Flexibility and Enforcement in the WTO (Paperback)
• Publisher: Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
• Publication Date: 2014
• Language: English
• ISBN 10: 1107638186
• ISBN 13: 9781107638181
• Binding: Paperback
• Condition: new

About this title

Synopsis

The World Trade Organization (WTO) is an incomplete contract among sovereign countries. Trade policy flexibility mechanisms are designed to deal with contractual gaps, which are the inevitable consequence of this contractual incompleteness. Trade policy flexibility mechanisms are backed up by enforcement instruments which allow for punishment of illegal extra-contractual conduct. This book offers a legal and economic analysis of contractual escape and punishment in the WTO. It assesses the interrelation between contractual incompleteness, trade policy flexibility mechanisms, contract enforcement, and WTO Members' willingness to co-operate and to commit to trade liberalization. It contributes to the body of WTO scholarship by providing a systematic assessment of the weaknesses of the current regime of escape and punishment in the WTO, and the systemic implications that these weaknesses have for the international trading system, before offering a reform agenda that is concrete, politically realistic, and systemically viable.

About the Author

Simon Schropp is an International Trade Policy Analyst for Sidley Austin LLP, a leading law firm in international trade law and WTO litigation. He has previously worked for the WTO Secretariat and as a research fellow investigating legal and economic issues of the WTO.