Truth and the End of Inquiry: A Peircean Account of Truth (Oxford Philosophical Monographs)

C.S. Peirce, the founder of pragmatism, argued that truth is what we would agree upon, were inquiry to be pursued as far as it could fruitfully go. In this book, Misak argues for and elucidates the pragmatic account of truth, paying attention both to Peirce's texts and to the requirements of a suitable account of truth. An important argument of the book is that we must be sensitive to the difference between offering a definition of truth and engaging in a distinctively pragmatic project. The pragmatic project spells out the relationship between truth and inquiry; it articulates the consequences of a statement's being true. The existence of a distinct pragmatic enterprise has implications for the status of the pragmatic account of truth and for the way in which philosophy should be conducted.

C..S. Pierce, the founder of pragmatism, argued that truth is what we would agree upon, were inquiry to be pursued as far as it could fruitfully go. In this book Cheryl Misak argues for and elucidates the pragmatic account of truth, paying attention both to Peirce's text and to the requirements of a suitable account of the truth. In her account, the correspondence theory of truth is rejected, yet relativism is avoided and the principle of bivalence is preserved, albeit in unusual way.