Unbelievable Errors : An Error Theory About All Normative Judgements. This item is unavailable.
Language: English
Published by Oxford University Press, 2023
- Softcover
- New

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- Title
- Unbelievable Errors : An Error Theory About All Normative Judgements
- Author
- Streumer, Bart
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press
- Publication year
- 2023
- Condition
- New
- Binding
- Soft cover
- Language
- English
- ISBN 10
- 0198892942
- ISBN 13
- 9780198892946
In Unbelievable Errors, Bart Streumer defends an error theory about all normative judgements: not just moral judgements, but also judgements about reasons for action, judgements about reasons for belief, and instrumental normative judgements. This theory says that these judgements are beliefs that ascribe normative properties, but that these properties do not exist. It therefore entails that all normative judgements are false.
Streumer also argues, however, that we cannot believe this error theory. This may seem to be a problem for the theory, but he argues that it is not. Instead, he argues, our inability to believe this error theory makes the theory more likely to be true, since it undermines objections to the theory, it makes it harder to reject the arguments for the theory, and it undermines revisionary alternatives to the theory.
Streumer then sketches how certain other philosophical views can be defended in a similar way, and how philosophers should modify their method if there can be true theories that we cannot believe. He concludes that to make philosophical progress, we should sharply distinguish the truth of a theory from our ability to believe it
Streumer also argues, however, that we cannot believe this error theory. This may seem to be a problem for the theory, but he argues that it is not. Instead, he argues, our inability to believe this error theory makes the theory more likely to be true, since it undermines objections to the theory, it makes it harder to reject the arguments for the theory, and it undermines revisionary alternatives to the theory.
Streumer then sketches how certain other philosophical views can be defended in a similar way, and how philosophers should modify their method if there can be true theories that we cannot believe. He concludes that to make philosophical progress, we should sharply distinguish the truth of a theory from our ability to believe it
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About the Author
Bart Streumer, University of Groningen
Bart Streumer is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Groningen. He previously taught at the University of Reading. His work has appeared in journals such as the Journal of Philosophy, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Philosophical Studies, and the Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
Bart Streumer is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Groningen. He previously taught at the University of Reading. His work has appeared in journals such as the Journal of Philosophy, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Philosophical Studies, and the Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
"About the title" may belong to another edition of this title.