Understanding Inconsistent Science

Vickers, Peter

ISBN 10: 0199692025 / ISBN 13: 9780199692026

Published by Oxford University Press, 2013

About this Item

Peter Vickers examines 'inconsistent theories' in the history of science-theories which, though contradictory, are held to be extremely useful. He argues that these 'theories' are actually significantly different entities, and warns that the traditional goal of philosophy to make substantial, general claims about how science works is misguided. Num Pages: 288 pages, illustrations. BIC Classification: HP; PDA; PDX. Category: (G) General (US: Trade); (P) Professional & Vocational; (U) Tertiary Education (US: College). Dimension: 239 x 160 x 21. Weight in Grams: 578. . 2013. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.

Seller Inventory # V9780199692026

Bibliographic Details

• Title: Understanding Inconsistent Science
• Publisher: Oxford University Press
• Publication Date: 2013
• Language: English
• ISBN 10: 0199692025
• ISBN 13: 9780199692026
• Binding: Hardcover
• Condition: New

About this title

Synopsis

In recent years philosophers of science have urged that many scientific theories are extremely useful and successful despite being internally inconsistent. Via an investigation of eight alleged "inconsistent theories" in the history of science, Peter Vickers urges that this view is at best overly simplistic. Most of these cases can only be described as examples of "inconsistent science" if we employ reconstructions of science which depart from the real (history of) science to an unacceptable degree. And where we do find genuine inconsistency he argues that the nature of--and correct response to--the inconsistency differs dramatically depending on the details of the science in question. Thus we are warned against making overly general claims about 'science': what are all called "theories" in the history of science are actually significantly different entities, which work in different ways and react to inconsistency in different ways. Vickers argues that the traditional goal of philosophy to make substantial, fully general claims about "how science works" is misguided, and can be significantly circumvented if we re-frame our debates such that reference to "theories" is eliminated. In this way one is not tempted to think of the history of science as a history of instances of the same kind--theory--about which one could hope to say something substantial and general. And in addition eliminating theory means that we avoid fruitless debates about the 'real' nature and content of "theories." Vickers' account leads to a particularist philosophy of science, where the reader is urged to appreciate the often dramatic differences between the different "inconsistencies in science" which have been identified.

About the Author

Peter Vickers completed his undergraduate BSc in Mathematics and Philosophy at the University of York in 2003. This was followed by an MA in History and Philosophy of Science at the University of Leeds, completed in 2005, and a PhD in the history and philosophy of science, also at the University of Leeds in 2009. Following a year teaching at Leeds, Vickers spent a year as a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Center for Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh, before returning to the UK in 2011 as a Lecturer in Philosophy at Durham University.