Value and Justification: The Foundations of Liberal Theory (Cambridge Studies in Philosophy)

Gaus, Gerald F.

ISBN 10: 0521397332 / ISBN 13: 9780521397339

Published by Cambridge University Press, 1990

About this Item

Develops a theory of value that seeks to reconcile reason with passions, and explores how this grounds our commitment to moral action. The author argues that rational moral action can neither be seen as a way of just maximizing one's own values, nor derived from reason independent of one's values. Series Editor(s): Sosa, Ernest; Dancy, Jonathan; Haldane, John; Harman, Gilbert; Jackson, Frank; Lycan, William G.; Shoemaker, Sydney; Thomson, Judith Jarvis. Series: Cambridge Studies in Philosophy. Num Pages: 560 pages, Illustrations. BIC Classification: HPS. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational. Dimension: 144 x 216 x 34. . . 1990. Illustrated. paperback. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.

Seller Inventory # V9780521397339

Bibliographic Details

• Title: Value and Justification: The Foundations of Liberal Theory (Cambridge Studies in Philosophy)
• Publisher: Cambridge University Press
• Publication Date: 1990
• Language: English
• ISBN 10: 0521397332
• ISBN 13: 9780521397339
• Binding: Soft cover
• Condition: New

About this title

Synopsis

This important new book takes as its points of departure two questions: What is the nature of valuing? and What morality can be justified in a society that deeply disagrees on what is truly valuable? In Part One, the author develops a theory of value that attempts to reconcile reason with passions. Part Two explores how this theory of value grounds our commitment to moral action. The author argues that rational moral action can neither be seen as a way of simply maximising one's own values, nor derived from reason independent of one's values. Rather, our commitment to the moral point of view is presupposed by our value systems. The book concludes with a defense of liberal political morality.

Book Description

Rational moral action can neither be seen as a way of maximising personal values, nor derived from reason independent of them is this study's assertion. It contends that commitment to the moral point of view is presupposed by value systems.Rational moral action can neither be seen as a way of maximising personal values, nor derived from reason independent of them is this study's assertion. It contends that commitment to the moral point of view is presupposed by value systems.