Voting Paradoxes and Group Coherence: The Condorcet Efficiency of Voting Rules (Studies in Choice and Welfare)

Gehrlein, William V.,Lepelley, Dominique

ISBN 10: 364226610X / ISBN 13: 9783642266102

Published by Springer, 2013

About this Item

Connecting readers with great books since 1972! Used textbooks may not include companion materials such as access codes, etc. May have some wear or writing/highlighting. We ship orders daily and Customer Service is our top priority!

Seller Inventory # S_357211140

Bibliographic Details

• Title: Voting Paradoxes and Group Coherence: The Condorcet Efficiency of Voting Rules (Studies in Choice and Welfare)
• Publisher: Springer
• Publication Date: 2013
• Language: English
• ISBN 10: 364226610X
• ISBN 13: 9783642266102
• Binding: paperback
• Condition: Good

About this title

Synopsis

The likelihood of observing Condorcet's Paradox is known to be very low for elections with a small number of candidates if voters’ preferences on candidates reflect any significant degree of a number of different measures of mutual coherence. This reinforces the intuitive notion that strange election outcomes should become less likely as voters’ preferences become more mutually coherent. Similar analysis is used here to indicate that this notion is valid for most, but not all, other voting paradoxes. This study also focuses on the Condorcet Criterion, which states that the pairwise majority rule winner should be chosen as the election winner, if one exists. Representations for the Condorcet Efficiency of the most common voting rules are obtained here as a function of various measures of the degree of mutual coherence of voters’ preferences. An analysis of the Condorcet Efficiency representations that are obtained yields strong support for using Borda Rule.