WTO Panel Dynamics: From Power-based GATT Renderings to WTO Rule-based Adjudication

Revision with unchanged content. Many persons around the globe waited with great anticipation the creation of the World Trade Organization in 1995. The WTO with its panels and appellate bodies had the promise of bringing freer trade and fairer trade adjudication than the sometimes large country favoritism practiced under the previous GATT working party system. The question to ask is whether WTO panels and appellate bodies have lived up to the ideals of the Dispute Settlement Understanding as well as the Dispute Settlement Body for whom they serve. The research of this book seeks to understand where WTO panel decisions tend to be made, and why panels decide as they do. The findings of this research indicate that rule-based arguments carry the day in WTO panel renderings. This suggests that the power-weighted politics of working parties in the GATT has been superseded by principle rendering panels in the WTO.

is a Senior Lecturer in Politics, Economics, and Statistics at The Ohio State University at the Marion Campus. He holds a B.A. in Economics from Kenyon College, a M.S. in Economic History from the London School of Economics, and a PhD. in Political Science from Miami University. Political Economy is his specialty.