Stanford Kyle (55 results)

Paperback or Softback. Condition: New. American Frankenstein: How the United States Created a Monster! Book.

Hardcover. Condition: Very Good. Signed. Inscribed by author. Open Books is a nonprofit social venture that provides literacy experiences for thousands of readers each year through inspiring programs and creative capitalization of books.

Paperback. Condition: Very Good+. The official journal of the Philosophy of Science Association. Numerous contributors. Starts on page 483 and ends on 610. Spine is uncreased, binding tight and sturdy; text clean. A very nice copy. Ships from Dinkytown in Minneapolis, Minnesota.

Paperback. Condition: Very Good+. The official journal of the Philosophy of Science Association. Numerous contributors. Starts on page 317 and ends on 482. Spine is uncreased, binding tight and sturdy; text clean. A very nice copy. Ships from Dinkytown in Minneapolis, Minnesota.

Paperback. Condition: Very Good. The official journal of the Philosophy of Science Association. Numerous contributors. Starts on page 169 and ends on 316. Spine is uncreased, binding tight and sturdy; text clean. Bump to heel of spine. Ships from Dinkytown in Minneapolis, Minnesota.

paperback. Condition: Good. Connecting readers with great books since 1972! Used textbooks may not include companion materials such as access codes, etc. May have some wear or writing/highlighting. We ship orders daily and Customer Service is our top priority!

Condition: New. In.

Condition: Very Good. Former library copy. Pages intact with possible writing/highlighting. Binding strong with minor wear. Dust jackets/supplements may not be included. Includes library markings. Stock photo provided. Product includes identifying sticker. Better World Books: Buy Books. Do Good.

Condition: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Condition: New.

Paperback. Condition: New. The historical record of scientific inquiry, Stanford suggests, is characterized by what he calls the problem of unconceived alternatives. Past scientists have routinely failed even to conceive of alternatives to their own theories and lines of theoretical investigation, alternatives that were both well-confirmed by the evidence available at the time and sufficiently serious as to be ultimately accepted by later scientific communities. Stanford supports this claim with a detailed investigation of the mid-to-late 19th century theories of inheritance and generation proposed in turn by Charles Darwin, Francis Galton, and August Weismann. He goes on to argue that this historical pattern strongly suggests that there are equally well-confirmed and scientifically serious alternatives to our own best theories that remain currently unconceived. Moreover, this challenge is more serious than those rooted in either the so-called pessimistic induction or the underdetermination of theories by evidence, in part because existing realist responses to these latter challenges offer no relief from the problem of unconceived alternatives itself.Stanford concludes by investigating what positive account of the spectacularly successful edifice of modern theoretical science remains open to us if we accept that our best scientific theories are powerful conceptual tools for accomplishing our practical goals, but abandon the view that the descriptions of the world around us that they offer are therefore even probably or approximately true."Stanford has genuinely advanced the philosophical discussion about scientific realism with his careful articulation of the problem of unconceived alternatives."-- The Review of Metaphysics "Stanford's book deserves to be widely read. Its central argument is clearly stated, its conclusion is radical, it engages in a productive fashion with detailed case studies, and it lays down several substantial challenges to scientific realism. Lastly, it is consistently thought-provoking."-Science.

PF. Condition: New.

Condition: New.

Condition: New. In Exceeding Our Grasp , Stanford argues that careful attention to the history of scientific investigation invites a challenge to this view that is not well represented in contemporary debates about the nature of the scientific enterprise. Num Pages: 248 pages, black & white illustrations. BIC Classification: HP; PDA. Category: (UP) Postgraduate, Research & Scholarly. Dimension: 236 x 156 x 16. Weight in Grams: 370. . 2010. Paperback. . . . .

Condition: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Condition: New. In Exceeding Our Grasp , Stanford argues that careful attention to the history of scientific investigation invites a challenge to this view that is not well represented in contemporary debates about the nature of the scientific enterprise. Num Pages: 248 pages, black & white illustrations. BIC Classification: HP; PDA. Category: (UP) Postgraduate, Research & Scholarly. Dimension: 236 x 156 x 16. Weight in Grams: 370. . 2010. Paperback. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.

Condition: New.

hardcover. Condition: New. In shrink wrap. Looks like an interesting title!

Hardcover. Condition: new. New Copy. Customer Service Guaranteed.

Gebunden. Condition: New.

Condition: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Condition: New. In.

Condition: New.

Hardback. Condition: New. The incredible achievements of modern scientific theories lead most of us to embrace scientific realism: the view that our best theories offer us at least roughly accurate descriptions of otherwise inaccessible parts of the world like genes, atoms, and the big bang. In Exceeding Our Grasp, Stanford argues that careful attention to the history of scientific investigation invites a challenge to this view that is not well represented in contemporary debates about the nature of the scientific enterprise. The historical record of scientific inquiry, Stanford suggests, is characterized by what he calls the problem of unconceived alternatives. Past scientists have routinely failed even to conceive of alternatives to their own theories and lines of theoretical investigation, alternatives that were both well-confirmed by the evidence available at the time and sufficiently serious as to be ultimately accepted by later scientific communities. Stanford supports this claim with a detailed investigation of the mid-to-late 19th century theories of inheritance and generation proposed in turn by Charles Darwin, Francis Galton, and August Weismann. He goes on to argue that this historical pattern strongly suggests that there are equally well-confirmed and scientifically serious alternatives to our own best theories that remain currently unconceived. Moreover, this challenge is more serious than those rooted in either the so-called pessimistic induction or the underdetermination of theories by evidence, in part because existing realist responses to these latter challenges offer no relief from the problem of unconceived alternatives itself. Stanford concludes by investigating what positive account of the spectacularly successful edifice of modern theoretical science remains open to us if we accept that our best scientific theories are powerful conceptual tools for accomplishing our practical goals, but abandon the view that the descriptions of the world around us that they offer are therefore even probably or approximately true.

Condition: New. Argues that history reveals our routine failure to even conceive of well-confirmed alternatives to our scientific theories, and similar alternatives to our own theories likely remain unconceived. This title shows why defences of scientific realism cannot evade the problem and proposes an alternative positive image of the scientific enterprise. Num Pages: 248 pages, black & white illustrations. BIC Classification: HP; PDA. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational; (UP) Postgraduate, Research & Scholarly; (UU) Undergraduate. Dimension: 241 x 165 x 22. Weight in Grams: 508. . 2006. 1st Edition. hardcover. . . . .

Condition: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Paperback. Condition: New. The historical record of scientific inquiry, Stanford suggests, is characterized by what he calls the problem of unconceived alternatives. Past scientists have routinely failed even to conceive of alternatives to their own theories and lines of theoretical investigation, alternatives that were both well-confirmed by the evidence available at the time and sufficiently serious as to be ultimately accepted by later scientific communities. Stanford supports this claim with a detailed investigation of the mid-to-late 19th century theories of inheritance and generation proposed in turn by Charles Darwin, Francis Galton, and August Weismann. He goes on to argue that this historical pattern strongly suggests that there are equally well-confirmed and scientifically serious alternatives to our own best theories that remain currently unconceived. Moreover, this challenge is more serious than those rooted in either the so-called pessimistic induction or the underdetermination of theories by evidence, in part because existing realist responses to these latter challenges offer no relief from the problem of unconceived alternatives itself.Stanford concludes by investigating what positive account of the spectacularly successful edifice of modern theoretical science remains open to us if we accept that our best scientific theories are powerful conceptual tools for accomplishing our practical goals, but abandon the view that the descriptions of the world around us that they offer are therefore even probably or approximately true."Stanford has genuinely advanced the philosophical discussion about scientific realism with his careful articulation of the problem of unconceived alternatives."-- The Review of Metaphysics "Stanford's book deserves to be widely read. Its central argument is clearly stated, its conclusion is radical, it engages in a productive fashion with detailed case studies, and it lays down several substantial challenges to scientific realism. Lastly, it is consistently thought-provoking."-Science.

HRD. Condition: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. THIS BOOK IS PRINTED ON DEMAND. Established seller since 2000.

Condition: New. Argues that history reveals our routine failure to even conceive of well-confirmed alternatives to our scientific theories, and similar alternatives to our own theories likely remain unconceived. This title shows why defences of scientific realism cannot evade the problem and proposes an alternative positive image of the scientific enterprise. Num Pages: 248 pages, black & white illustrations. BIC Classification: HP; PDA. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational; (UP) Postgraduate, Research & Scholarly; (UU) Undergraduate. Dimension: 241 x 165 x 22. Weight in Grams: 508. . 2006. 1st Edition. hardcover. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.

Hardback. Condition: New. The incredible achievements of modern scientific theories lead most of us to embrace scientific realism: the view that our best theories offer us at least roughly accurate descriptions of otherwise inaccessible parts of the world like genes, atoms, and the big bang. In Exceeding Our Grasp, Stanford argues that careful attention to the history of scientific investigation invites a challenge to this view that is not well represented in contemporary debates about the nature of the scientific enterprise. The historical record of scientific inquiry, Stanford suggests, is characterized by what he calls the problem of unconceived alternatives. Past scientists have routinely failed even to conceive of alternatives to their own theories and lines of theoretical investigation, alternatives that were both well-confirmed by the evidence available at the time and sufficiently serious as to be ultimately accepted by later scientific communities. Stanford supports this claim with a detailed investigation of the mid-to-late 19th century theories of inheritance and generation proposed in turn by Charles Darwin, Francis Galton, and August Weismann. He goes on to argue that this historical pattern strongly suggests that there are equally well-confirmed and scientifically serious alternatives to our own best theories that remain currently unconceived. Moreover, this challenge is more serious than those rooted in either the so-called pessimistic induction or the underdetermination of theories by evidence, in part because existing realist responses to these latter challenges offer no relief from the problem of unconceived alternatives itself. Stanford concludes by investigating what positive account of the spectacularly successful edifice of modern theoretical science remains open to us if we accept that our best scientific theories are powerful conceptual tools for accomplishing our practical goals, but abandon the view that the descriptions of the world around us that they offer are therefore even probably or approximately true.