Dynamics Deterrence by Zagare Frank (13 results)

Condition: good. A copy that has been read, remains in good condition. All pages are intact, and the cover is intact. The spine and cover show signs of wear. Pages can include notes and highlighting and show signs of wear, and the copy can include "From the library of" labels or previous owner inscriptions. 100% GUARANTEE! Shipped with delivery confirmation, if you're not satisfied with purchase please return item! Ships via media mail.…

Hardcover. Condition: Très bon. Ancien livre de bibliothèque avec équipements. Edition 1986. Ammareal reverse jusqu'à 15% du prix net de cet article à des organisations caritatives. ENGLISH DESCRIPTION Book Condition: Used, Very good. Former library book. Edition 1986. Ammareal gives back up to 15% of this item's net price to charity organizations. …

hardcover. Condition: Good. HARDCOVER Good - Bumped and creased book with tears to the extremities, but not affecting the text block, may have remainder mark or previous owner's name - GOOD Standard-sized.

Condition: very good. Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1987. Hardcover. Dustjacket. xiii, 194 p. : ill. ; 23 cm. . Includes index./ Bibliography : p. 179-187 . Condition : very good copy. ISBN 9780226977638. Keywords : .

Condition: New. Brand New.

Condition: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Condition: New.

Condition: New. pp. 259 Index.

hardcover. Condition: New. In shrink wrap. Looks like an interesting title.

Condition: New. pp. 259 Figures.

Gebunden. Condition: New. &Uumlber den AutorFrank C. Zagare is assistant professor of political science at Boston University and is the author of Game Theory: Concepts & Applications.KlappentextThe value of a theory of d.

Hardcover. Condition: Very Good. Very Good. Dust Jacket may NOT BE INCLUDED.CDs may be missing. SHIPS FROM MULTIPLE LOCATIONS. book.

Buch. Condition: Neu. Neuware - The value of a theory of deterrence lies in its ability to reconstruct and predict strategic behavior accurately and consistently. Contemporary scholarship on deterrence has drawn upon decision models and classical game theory, with some success, to explain how deterrence works. But the field is marked by unconnected and sometimes contradictory hypotheses that may explain one type of situation while being inapplicable to another. 'The Dynamics of Deterrence is the first comprehensive treatment of deterrence theory since the mid-1960s. Frank C. Zagare introduces a new theoretical framework for deterrence that is rigorous, consistent, and illuminating. By placing the deterrence relationship in a 'theory of moves' framework, Zagare is able to remedy the defects of other models. His approach is illustrated by and applied to a number of complex deterrence situations: the Berlin crisis of 1948, the Middle East crises of 1967 and 1973, and The Falkland/Malvinas crisis of 1980. He also examines the strategic relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union from 1945 to the present. Zagare studies the dynamics of both mutual and unilateral deterrence games in nuclear and non-nuclear situations, and the impact of credibility, capability, and power asymmetries on deterrence stability. He shows that his theory is applicable for analyzing deterrence situations between allies as well as between hostile states. One of the additional strengths of his model, however, is its general usefulness for other levels and settings, such as deterrence games played by husband and wife, parent and child, employer and employee, and the state and its citizens. With its lucid prose and illustrativeexamples, 'The Dynamics of Deterrence will be of interest to a wide audience in international relations, peace studies, and political science.…