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Game Equilibrium Models I: Evolution and Game Dynamics
Language: English
Published by Springer-Verlag, Berlin and New York, 1991
ISBN 10: 0387542256 ISBN 13: 9780387542256
First Edition
Hardcover. Condition: Good. Dust Jacket Condition: No Dust Jacket. First Edition. An ex-library copy in original dark gray hard covers lettered in yellow and whiite. The usual ex-libris markings. The binding is sound, the text is clean/unmarked, and there is little cover wear. No dust jacket, apparently as issued. Book.
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Game Equilibrium Models I: Evolution and Game Dynamics
Seller: Munster & Company LLC, ABAA/ILAB, Corvallis, OR, U.S.A.
Association Member: ABAA CBA ILAB
Seller rating 5 out of 5 stars
Condition: Good. Springer Verlag, 1991. Volume I only; cover very rubbed/lightly soiled, board edges bumped, significant bump/tear in top edge of rear board, corners very rubbed/bumped, spine ends very rubbed/bumped; edges soiled/foxed; ffep has erasures; some foxing to first five and last five pages; binding tight; cover, edges, and interior intact and clean except as noted. hardcover. Good.
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Game Equilibrium Models I: Evolution and Game Dynamics
Seller: Ria Christie Collections, Uxbridge, United Kingdom
Seller rating 5 out of 5 stars
US$ 69.32
US$ 15.87 shipping
Ships from United Kingdom to U.S.A.Quantity: Over 20 available
Add to basketCondition: New. In.
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Game Equilibrium Models I: Evolution and Game Dynamics
Seller: Ria Christie Collections, Uxbridge, United Kingdom
Seller rating 5 out of 5 stars
US$ 69.32
US$ 15.87 shipping
Ships from United Kingdom to U.S.A.Quantity: Over 20 available
Add to basketCondition: New. In.
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US$ 103.72
US$ 33.13 shipping
Ships from United Kingdom to U.S.A.Quantity: 1 available
Add to basketPaperback. Condition: Like New. LIKE NEW. SHIPS FROM MULTIPLE LOCATIONS. book.
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Taschenbuch. Condition: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - There are two main approaches towards the phenotypic analysis of frequency dependent natural selection. First, there is the approach of evolutionary game theory, which was introduced in 1973 by John Maynard Smith and George R. Price. In this theory, the dynamical process of natural selection is not modeled explicitly. Instead, the selective forces acting within a population are represented by a fitness function, which is then analysed according to the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy or ESS. Later on, the static approach of evolutionary game theory has been complemented by a dynamic stability analysis of the replicator equations. Introduced by Peter D. Taylor and Leo B. Jonker in 1978, these equations specify a class of dynamical systems, which provide a simple dynamic description of a selection process. Usually, the investigation of the replicator dynamics centers around a stability analysis of their stationary solutions. Although evolutionary stability and dynamic stability both intend to characterize the long-term outcome of frequency dependent selection, these concepts differ considerably in the 'philosophies' on which they are based. It is therefore not too surprising that they often lead to quite different evolutionary predictions (see, e. g. , Weissing 1983). The present paper intends to illustrate the incongruities between the two approaches towards a phenotypic theory of natural selection. A detailed game theoretical and dynamical analysis is given for a generic class of evolutionary normal form games.
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Game Equilibrium Models I : Evolution and Game Dynamics
Language: English
Published by Springer-Verlag GmbH, 1991
ISBN 10: 3540542256 ISBN 13: 9783540542254
Condition: Sehr gut. Zustand: Sehr gut | Seiten: 330 | Sprache: Englisch | Produktart: Bücher | Keine Beschreibung verfügbar.
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Game Equilibrium Models I : Evolution and Game Dynamics
Language: English
Published by Springer-Verlag GmbH, 1991
ISBN 10: 3540542256 ISBN 13: 9783540542254
Condition: Sehr gut. Zustand: Sehr gut | Seiten: 330 | Sprache: Englisch | Produktart: Bücher | Keine Beschreibung verfügbar.
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Game Equilibrium Models I : Evolution and Game Dynamics
Language: English
Published by Springer-Verlag GmbH, 1991
ISBN 10: 3540542256 ISBN 13: 9783540542254
Condition: Hervorragend. Zustand: Hervorragend | Seiten: 330 | Sprache: Englisch | Produktart: Bücher | Keine Beschreibung verfügbar.
