Adaptive Efficiency During the Great Recession: An Analysis of the Institutional and Organizational Determinants of Crisis Resilience (Economy and Politics)

Paperback, xvi + 379 pages, NOT ex-library. Likely unread, minor handling wear only. Book is clean and bright with unmarked text, free of inscriptions and stamps, firmly bound. Straight uncreased spine. -- This study provides a detailed empirical analysis of the factors that contributed to organizational resilience during the Great Recession of 2008-2009. The author develops a theoretical framework of "adaptive efficiency" to investigate why some firms were better able to withstand the economic crisis than others. The work moves beyond purely financial metrics to examine the crucial role of institutional and organizational determinants, such as corporate governance structures, labor relations (including works councils), and the specific national institutional context (using Germany as a key case study). It serves as a key text in institutional economics, offering insights into how non-market coordination and stakeholder-oriented governance can enhance a firm's ability to adapt to severe economic shocks. -- Robert Fritzsch's study offers a rigorous institutional economic analysis of the factors that influenced countries' resilience to the 2008-2012 global financial crisis. Drawing on the frameworks of Mancur Olson and of North, Wallis, and Weingast (NWW), the book critically re-examines prominent theories of adaptive efficiency, which posit that democratic political institutions, rule of law, and restrained regulation promote long-term economic stability. Fritzsch finds that, contrary to these expectations, the Great Recession hit developed democracies the hardest, suggesting that institutional resilience may not always align with theoretical assumptions. The volume is structured into five comprehensive chapters. It begins with a conceptual overview of adaptive efficiency and crisis resilience, followed by detailed theoretical expositions of Olson's and NWW's accounts. These are evaluated not only on their explanatory power but also for their limitations - particularly their neglect of adaptation costs and structural stability. Fritzsch then develops an empirical framework that draws from literature on institutional economics, interest groups, and growth. Using quantitative analysis, the author examines how various economic and political institutions - including rule of law, business and labor regulation, financial frameworks, government size, and interest group activity - shaped national responses to the crisis. The findings suggest that while institutional quality matters, its effects are uneven and context-dependent. In developed countries, strong rule of law and moderate regulation are positively associated with resilience. However, these relationships weaken outside this subgroup. Fritzsch concludes that adaptive efficiency should be redefined to account for structural trade-offs and institutional inertia. His study contributes to a more nuanced understanding of institutional capacity, highlighting the complexity of crafting policy frameworks resilient to systemic shocks. The book advances theoretical and empirical debates in institutional economics and political economy.…