Arms Control Agreements; Designs for Verification and Organization

Wainhouse, David W., in association with Bechhoefer, Bernhard G., and Hughes, Harry D., and Leary, Byron V., and Rockwell III, Theodore, and Simons, Anne P. and Wolfers, Arnold

Published by The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, Maryland, 1968

About this Item

ix, [3], 179, [1] pages. Tables. Fig. Includes Introduction, Notes, Index, and Biographical Notes. Topics covered include Organizational Arrangements for Verifying Arms Control; and Designs for an International Arms Control Organization. Wainhouse was an international lawyer, author and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State during the Eisenhower Administration. Wainhouse became minister to Austria, director of the Office of United Nations Political Affairs and Assistant Secretary of State. He was also a consultant for the international conference on atomic energy in Geneva. . He was also the author of several books in international law including "Arms Control Agreements" and "International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads". Mr. Wainhouse received doctorates at Harvard and Oxford University. From 1935 to 1957 Wolfers was a professor of international politics at Yale University and was an advisor to government organizations. Part I contains three case studies which deal with the question of nuclear arms and a fourth on general and complete disarmament. The cases discussed are: The United States proposal for a halt in production of fissionable materials for military purposes; the Gomulka Proposals and the Rapacki Plan; the United States proposal for a freeze on the production of strategic missiles; and the problems of implementing Stage 1 of the United States proposal for general and complete disarmament. Part II is conceptual. It analyzes the kinds of verification problems which are likely to arise and develops general principles for the type of international organization that could most effectively them. The work concludes with an important recommendation for the creation of a single verification organization that could assume some or all of the functions that might be handled by several agencies. The authors believe that such an organization would increase the likelihood of viable arms control agreements by simplifying and consolidating the inspection function and by decreasing the costs and technical staff required.

Seller Inventory # 81011

Bibliographic Details

• Title: Arms Control Agreements; Designs for Verification and Organization
• Publisher: The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, Maryland
• Publication Date: 1968
• Binding: Hardcover
• Edition: Presumed First Edition, First printing.
• Condition: Very good
• Dust Jacket Condition: Very good
• Seller catalogs:
  • Nuclear Weapons
  • Disarmament