CAPTAINS WITHOUT EYES: Intelligence Failures in World War II

This copy is in fine unmarked condition bound in blue cloth covered boards with bright gilt titling to the spine. Bright, tight, white and square. The unclipped dust wrapper is in near fine condition. International postal rates are calculated on a book weighing 1 Kilo, in cases where the book weighs less then postage will be reduced accordingly. Where the book weighs more than 1 Kilo increased charges will be quoted. This excellent book, by a former Inspector General and Executive Director of the CIA, describes the role of the failure in gathering and analyzing intelligence behind Barbarossa (German attack on Russia), Pearl Harbor, the 1942 Allied landing at Dieppe, France, the "Market Garden" assault on Arnhem ("A Bridge Too Far"), and the Battle of the Bulge. An author writing a book like this can be subject to many temptations. He could decide to regurgitate at length the already-known history of 20th Century Europe. Or the author could limit his discussion to the battles themselves and not place them in context. Or he could use selective hindsight to point out _in hindsight_ the NOW-"obvious" clues that were missed then. For instance, while there were certainly some indications that Japan would attack Pearl Harbor, there were much stronger indications that Japan would attack elsewhere, and even that Japan would do anything to avoid war with the United States. Kirkpatrick avoids all the temptations to turn his book into something too broad, too narrow, or not taking into account the entire picture presented to policy-makers at the time. What Kirkpatrick does is an excellent job of putting us "at the scene," on BOTH sides of each battle. He points out what intelligence was available to each government relating to these incidents, and how it was used, or misused. He tells us what led to these misperceptions, how the mistaken resulting actions affected the rest of the War, and what might have been done differently with a better use of intelligence. Along the way Kirkpatrick places each action itself into the context of the War and politics. He writes about how stubborn or deluded personalities acted in spite of available information, and the persistent habit of many to overestimate their own capabilities and underestimate the other side's capabilities, together with a sometimes fatal view of the other side's intentions, motivations, and psyche. For instance, the Japanese thought that the attack on Pearl Harbor might well bring about a peace agreement with the U.S. Ref GGG4.…