Synopsis
Using previously unreleased documents, the author reveals new evidence that FDR knew the attack on Pearl Harbor was coming and did nothing to prevent it
Reviews
Historians have long debated whether President Roosevelt had advance knowledge of Japan's December 7, 1941, attack on Pearl Harbor. Using documents pried loose through the Freedom of Information Act during 17 years of research, Stinnett provides overwhelming evidence that FDR and his top advisers knew that Japanese warships were heading toward Hawaii. The heart of his argument is even more inflammatory: Stinnett argues that FDR, who desired to sway public opinion in support of U.S. entry into WWII, instigated a policy intended to provoke a Japanese attack. The plan was outlined in a U.S. Naval Intelligence secret strategy memo of October 1940; Roosevelt immediately began implementing its eight steps (which included deploying U.S. warships in Japanese territorial waters and imposing a total embargo intended to strangle Japan's economy), all of which, according to Stinnett, climaxed in the Japanese attack. Stinnett, a decorated naval veteran of WWII who served under then Lt. George Bush, substantiates his charges with a wealth of persuasive documents, including many government and military memos and transcripts. Demolishing the myth that the Japanese fleet maintained strict radio silence, he shows that several Japanese naval broadcasts, intercepted by American cryptographers in the 10 days before December 7, confirmed that Japan intended to start the war at Pearl Harbor. Stinnett convincingly demonstrates that the U.S. top brass in Hawaii--Pacific Fleet commander Adm. Husband Kimmel and Lt. Gen. Walter Short--were kept out of the intelligence loop on orders from Washington and were then scapegoated for allegedly failing to anticipate the Japanese attack (in May 1999, the U.S. Senate cleared their names). Kimmel moved his fleet into the North Pacific, actively searching for the suspected Japanese staging area, but naval headquarters ordered him to turn back. Stinnett's meticulously researched book raises deeply troubling ethical issues. While he believes the deceit built into FDR's strategy was heinous, he nevertheless writes: "I sympathize with the agonizing dilemma faced by President Roosevelt. He was forced to find circuitous means to persuade an isolationist America to join in a fight for freedom." This, however, is an expression of understanding, not of absolution. If Stinnett is right, FDR has a lot to answer for--namely, the lives of those Americans who perished at Pearl Harbor. Stinnett establishes almost beyond question that the U.S. Navy could have at least anticipated the attack. The evidence that FDR himself deliberately provoked the attack is circumstantial, but convincing enough to make Stinnett's bombshell of a book the subject of impassioned debate in the months to come. (Dec.)
Copyright 1999 Reed Business Information, Inc.
An explosive, well-written look at the events leading up to the Japanese raid on Pearl harbor, including FDRs provocation of the attack, by a WWII veteran and longtime journalist. Though rumors have long circulated about American prior knowledge of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Stinnett has gone far beyond his models in substantiating the state of American intelligence, diplomacy, and readiness in the year preceding December 7, 1941. Though Stinnett easily makes his case that the Unites States knew an attack was coming and did not prepare for it, even more shocking is his discovery that the North Pacific area, where an attack was believed likely to originate, was declared a ``vacant sea'' just weeks prior to the attack and any patrols were forbidden in this area. The real heart of the book is the argument that the attack on Pearl Harbor was deliberately instigated by the Roosevelt Administration as a way of quickly bringing a unified America into the war. Stinnett begins his case by quoting a policy memo written by Lt. Cdr. Arthur McCullum listing eight actions designed to incite a military action by Japan, including such actions as the blocking of the sale of oil to the Japanese, maintaining a heavy US naval presence in the Pacific, and supporting Chiang Kai-shek in China. After showing how this plan was carried out, he then goes on to show how this effort systematically led up to Pearl Harbor. Although too little is made of the context in which Roosevelt apparently made the decision to allow the attack to go unchecked (it is only in the closing sections that this issue is even discussed), Stinnett has left no stone unturned in this account, which should rewrite the historical record of WWII. -- Copyright ©1999, Kirkus Associates, LP. All rights reserved.
Most scholars long ago concluded that the Franklin Roosevelt presidency ranks as the best of the 20th century. They also have recognized that a dark thread was woven throughout FDR's publicly perceived ebullient personality. This volume is a new chapter in a decades-old controversy surrounding FDR: Did he somehow have advance knowledge of the attack on his own navy at Pearl Harbor? The author, a journalist and a World War II veteran who served with Lt. George H.W. Bush and later wrote George Bush: His World War II Years, asserts that FDR actually provoked Pearl Harbor. He bases his sensational conclusion on his archival research and interviews with surviving U.S. Navy cryptographers. Having uncovered some strange advice from naval officers, the author then infers that FDR followed that advice. (Yet presidents get all kinds of advice.) Contemporary and classic Roosevelt haters (see Albert Fried's FDR and His Enemies, LJ 8/99) will cherish this book as they celebrate the recent close vote in the Republican-dominated U.S. Senate that posthumously cleared the two most senior naval officers whom FDR had held responsible for the Pearl Harbor debacle. However, other readers, especially academic historians and FDR supporters, will be far less convinced by this new rehearsal of the old, highly speculative charges, which takes research out of context and reflects contemporary anti-government sentiment. However well intentioned, journalists who play amateur historian often write misleading history.AWilliam D. Pederson, Louisiana State Univ., Shreveport
Copyright 1999 Reed Business Information, Inc.
The Pearl Harbor disaster continues to be controversial. Uncertainty about whether the U.S. had knowledge of the Japanese attack has led to books suspicious of FDR's actions, such as John Toland's Infamy (1982). Although Stinnett's accusatory light doesn't definitively fall on FDR, it illuminates fishy aspects of the case. For starters, Stinnett, despite his assiduous Freedom of Information Act campaign that produced most of his data, was often stymied by official secrecy still enveloping certain decryptions of Japanese radio communications. Second, Stinnett reports that 13 messages from the Japanese commander, Yamamoto, to his attack force are missing from the American archive of decrypts. Third, Stinnett interviewed radio intelligence officers who recalled locating the force as it crossed the Pacific, contrary to lore that holds it sailed undetected. And the naval base commander was handcuffed: two weeks prior to the attack, he was ordered to stop patrolling waters north of Oahu. Whether the result of simple dereliction or sinister dereliction of duty, Pearl Harbor holds fewer secrets because of Stinnett's research. Gilbert Taylor
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